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Brazil and Argentina, despite geographic proximity and similar histories of oppressive 
military dictatorships, have pursued decidedly different policies toward judicial 
accountability for crimes committed during the regime period. In Brazil, amnesty 
persists, while in Argentina, prosecutions started in 2005. These opposing policies beg 
the question: what factors determine the introduction and persistence of amnesty laws in 
a post-conflict reconstruction process? This paper uses comparative case studies to 
investigate the impact of the type of transition a society undergoes, as well as the role of 
the judiciary, the executive, human rights organizations, external actors, and public 
opinion in predicting a country's approach to justice for former offenders. The results 
suggest that the role of the executive and judiciary are of primary importance in 
abrogating or affirming amnesty, while human rights organizations and external actors 
can play a substantial role in establishing accountability if they are able to influence 
decision-making bodies. More fundamentally, the factors explaining why amnesty is 
introduced and maintained are interconnected, and a combination of forces are necessary 
to establish individual accountability measures. 
 
 




The concept of transitional justice has garnered the attention of scholars, public 
officials, and citizens in post-conflict societies. The process of transitional justice has 
increased since the second world war. Now, more countries embark on a process of 
transitional justice following political transformation, a series of measures that often, 
though not always, includes trials of former offenders. Historically, neither institutional 
mechanisms to ensure accountability nor amnesty laws, granting blanket impunity, 
existed in post-conflict society; war criminals and their human rights violations were 
unaddressed in new democracies. Today, however, it is both possible and common for a 
perpetrator of crimes against humanity to be held individually accountable in an 
international or domestic context. Although international attempts at accountability in 
 4 
post-conflict scenarios have been attempted since 1815, their efforts toward justice were 
typically fruitless.1 But, over time, things changed considerably. In a striking example of 
individual accountability, on September 5, 2003, Dragan Nikolic pleaded guilty to 
gruesome human rights violations committed during the 1992-1995 Bosnian War.2 
Nikolic admitted personally taking part in brutalities against prisoners at the Susica 
detention camp, including committing numerous murders, employing ax handles to beat 
prisoners, and allowing Serbian soldiers and guards to abuse and rape Muslim women 
and girls every night.3 Mr. Nikolic was the 11th person to plead guilty at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Hague, but his guilty plea stood out. 
Mr. Nikolic had been the first man indicted by the tribunal in 1994 and was not captured 
until six years later in 2000 when he went to trial and pleaded not guilty. At his 2003 
trial, however, the outcome was quite extraordinary. For nearly 30 minutes, the German 
judge Wolfgang Schomburg read the full text of Nikolic’s indictment, pausing after each 
paragraph and asking Nikolic to affirm its correctness. Repeatedly, after each gruesome 
account of crimes against humanity, Nikolic reasserted that he had indeed committed 
them, responding “Correct” or “Yes, your honor” at Judge Schomburg’s pauses.4 
 Trials like Nikolic’s have become more routine since the end of the Cold War. 
Holding perpetrators of human rights abuses individually accountable through trials poses 
a stark contrast to previous policies of overlooking past war crimes. This “new age of 
1 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 5. 
2 Marlise Simons, “Serb at Hague Pleads Guilty to Brutalities,” New York Times, September 5, 2003, 
accessed March 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/05/world/serb-at-hague-pleads-guilty-to-
brutalities.html. 
3 Simons, “Serb at Hague.” 
4 Simons, “Serb at Hague.” 
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accountability,” as UN Secretary Ban ki-Moon has dubbed it5, has reached every region 
of the world and has become entrenched in international conventions; nonetheless, 
amnesty laws and the impunity they ensure are also common among post-conflict 
communities. This thesis will investigate why some countries pursue accountability while 
others promote amnesty. 
 In this introduction, I will provide a brief compendium of transitional justice and 
address trends in legal norms regarding personal accountability. I will address the 
increased presence of individual accountability for human rights violations and this 
concept’s presence in international treaties. Further, the many outlets for carrying out 
accountability measures will be explained. This discussion will form the backdrop of 
qualitative case studies of Argentina and Brazil, both of which transitioned to democracy 
in the 1980s. Argentina and Brazil have conflicting policies toward accountability despite 
sharing a similar history of human rights violations by oppressive military regimes.  
 
Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice can be defined as “the process by which societies move either 
from war to peace or from a repressive/authoritarian regime to democracy while dealing 
with resulting questions of justice and what to do with social, political, and economic 
institutions.”6 Through her empirical research of states in the midst of transitional justice 
processes, Wendy Lambourne identifies four key forms of justice: truth, socioeconomic, 
5 Ban Ki-moon, “The Age of Accountability,” UN Chronicle, 2010, accessed February 10, 2013, 
http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/chronicle/home/archive/webarticles2010/The_Age_of_Accountability. 
6 Joanna R. Quinn, Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2009), 3. 
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political, and accountability.7 Truth refers not only to fact-finding attempts, but also to 
offenders acknowledging their responsibility in the conflict and how it impacted society 
in order to best aid the reconciliation process.8 The process of obtaining the truth is 
perhaps most commonly carried out by truth commissions. Socioeconomic justice 
incorporates monetary “compensation, restitution or reparation for past violations or 
crimes (historical justice) and distributive or socioeconomic justice in the future 
(prospective justice).”9 The new government’s capacity to provide basic services without 
corruption refers to the political justice aspect of transitional justice and can be embodied 
through actions like institutional reform.10 Finally, accountability entails legal justice and 
responsibility for war crimes and can take a variety of forms.11 
 
International Organizations and Accountability 
The UN similarly understands transitional justice as a multifaceted process. 
According to the United Nations’ approach to transitional justice, the process consists of 
both judicial and non-judicial components including “individual prosecutions, 
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting, and dismissals.”12 The UN 
stresses support for the rule of law, defined as:  
a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, 
and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the 
7 Wendy Lambourne, “Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding after Mass Violence,” The International 
Journal for Transitional Justice 3 (2009): 37. 
8 Ibid., 39. 
9 Ibid., 41. 
10 Ibid., 44. 
11 Ibid., 37. 
12 “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,” October 2010, accessed 
January 22, 2012, http://www.unrol.org/files/S_2011_634EN.pdf. 
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principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to 
the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, 
participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. 13 
 
In order to establish the most appropriate combination of tactics to facilitate the 
transitional justice process, the UN vows to encourage compliance with international 
legal standards, account for the state’s political realities, address unique contexts, and 
“ensure the centrality of victims in the design and implementation of transitional justice 
processes and mechanisms.”14  
Although transitional justice is clearly complex, accountability is often a bastion 
of the transitional justice process and serves as the focus of this thesis. Specifically, I am 
interested in why states with similar histories differ in their pursuit of individual 
accountability for crimes against humanity. Accountability refers to the idea that “some 
actors have the right to hold other actors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have 
fulfilled their responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if they 
determine that these responsibilities have not been met.”15 Kathryn Sikkink refers to 
three different models of accountability when it comes to human rights violations: “(1) 
the immunity or ‘impunity’ model; (2); the state accountability model; and (3) the 
individual criminal accountability model.”16 The first model of impunity characterized 
the approach used prior to World War II, when both states and state officials were 
granted amnesty explicitly or implicitly after a conflict and were not prosecuted. After the 
13 “The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies,” August 2004, accessed 
January 22, 2012, http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/395/29/PDF/N0439529.pdf?OpenElement 
14 « Guidance Note of the Secretary General, United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice, » March 
2010, accessed January 22, 2012, http://www.unrol.org/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf. 
15 Ruth Grant and Robert O. Keohane, “Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics,” American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (February 2005): 30. 
16 Kathryn Sikkink, “The Age of Accountability,” in Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability, 
ed. Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 23. 
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Holocaust, however, when demands for justice increased, the second model of state 
accountability became common, whereby states were asked by the international 
community, usually because of a state’s obligations as part of an international 
organization, to change their policy.17 However, the enforcement of state accountability 
was weak, and human rights violations continued. The individual criminal accountability 
model was utilized in an attempt to curb their occurrences, although presently, it coexists 
with the impunity model that is still maintained in some post-conflict societies. 
Transitional justice is multifaceted and diverse empirically, and those who 
committed crimes against humanity can encounter a wide range of outcomes in the new 
democracy. Since World War II, various human rights treaties established the obligation 
to ensure an appropriate remedy after human rights violations have occurred. Born out of 
liberalism, Bass suggests that universalistic legalism took root, and states began 
prosecutions in accordance with domestic norms. These domestic, individual human 
rights norms were assumed to apply universally, transcending sovereignty.18 Originally 
established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, the concept of state 
responsibility for human rights abuses was reaffirmed through the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.19 These conventions primarily upheld 
the state responsibility model of accountability, merely asking states to remedy their 
human rights situations given their obligations as signatories of human rights treaties. 
17 Kathryn Sikkink, “From State Responsibility to Individual Criminal Accountability: A New Regulatory 
Model for Core Human Rights Violations,” in The Politics of Global Regulation, ed. Walter Mattli and 
Ngaire Woods (Princeton University Press, 2009), 123. 
18 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000), 2. 
19 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (adopted December 10, 1948), UN Doc. A/810, art. 8.; 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICERD), General Assembly Res. 2200 A (XXI), 
adopted December 1966, UN GAOR, 21st sess., Supp. No. 16, UN Doc. A/6316 (1967), 52. 
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States were not yet obliged to prosecute specific people who had committed human rights 
violations. This said, the individual accountability model was in fact established through 
later conventions. The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 
1984 and obligates states to include torture as an offense under domestic law, to 
investigate cases of torture, and to prosecute or execute those who are accused of 
torture.20 Furthermore, it establishes the concept of universal jurisdiction in the event that 
domestic prosecutions are untenable in Article 5, Paragraph 2.21 Universal jurisdiction 
refers to a situation wherein a “state, without seeking to protect its security or credit, 
seeks to punish conduct irrespective of the place where it occurs, the nationality of the 
perpetrator, and the nationality of the victim.”22 Universal jurisdiction has been invoked 
in a range of cases, notably that of Augusto Pinochet.23 
Regional treaties like the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish 
Torture and the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment further entrenched the status of torture as a domestic 
crime necessitating domestic prosecutions on the individual level in the late 1980s.24 
The so-called age of accountability has been affirmed through a variety of justice 
seeking bodies like the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
established in 1993 by the UN Security Council to try individuals accused of human 
20 Sikkink, “Age of Accountability,” 26-27. 
21 UN General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1465, 10 December 1984, accessed January 23, 201, 
85,  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3a94.html. 
22 Luc Reydams, Universal Jurisdiction: International and Municipal Legal Perspectives, (New York: 
Oxford University Press), 5. 
23 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 11. 
24 Sikkink, “Age of Accountability,” 28. 
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rights violation in the former Yugoslavia.25 The International Criminal Court was 
established by the Rome Statute in 1998, which posited that some grave crimes are 
pernicious to the international community at large and therefore can be tried through this 
international court rather than only through a state’s domestic judicial system.26 Other 
special courts, like the Special Court of Sierra Leone, also illustrate the global presence 
of the individual accountability model.27 
 
Non-governmental Organizations and Accountability 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have come to play a more critical role 
in states’ transitional justice processes. The International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ), a non-profit that strives to ensure accountability after grave human rights 
violations, is emblematic of the increased international attention devoted to transitional 
justice. ICTJ believes the transitional justice process must address the core elements of 
criminal prosecutions, reparations, institutional reform, and truth commissions.28 Many 
have criticized positions taken by ICTJ and other trial advocates for suggesting a “one 
size fits all” approach to transitional justice. Critics argue that a standardized approach 
deemphasizes local context and that only after understanding the domestic situation can 
one “ask what, whether, and when transitional justice interventions should be 
initiated.”29Although trials of perpetrators of human rights abuses are often a crucial part 
of addressing mass atrocities, victims stress that trials alone are not enough, and some 
25 Ibid., 31. 
26 Ibid., 36. 
27 Sikkink, “Justice Cascade,” 3, 
28 « What is Transitional Justice ? » International Center for Transitional Justice, accessed January 22, 
2012, http://ictj.org/about/transitional-justice. 
29 Fletcher, Laurel, Harvey Weinstein, and Jamie Rowen, “Context, Timing and the Dynamic of 
Transitional Justice: A Historical Perspective”, Human Rights Quarterly 31 (2009): 170. 
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countries, such as South Africa, have embraced models of transitional justice that legally 
exclude a prosecutorial component.30 Nevertheless, ICTJ’s increased attention and role in 
a society’s transitional justice process suggests that international non-governmental 




Few scholars deny the recent spread of accountability practices, but amnesty laws 
are far from extinct, and many countries maintain policies of impunity. Moreover, 
amnesty has its share of supporters. Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri contend that 
“amnesties or other minimal efforts to address the problem of past abuses have often been 
the basis for durable peaceful settlements”31 claiming that advocates of prosecuting 
perpetrators of human rights violations ignore the political realities in a post-conflict 
state.32 Snyder and Vinjamuri are not the only prosecution skeptics; despite evidence of a 
“justice cascade,” or spreading norm of individual accountability practices, amnesty 
remains intact in many cases. 33 
 
Achieving Accountability 
Societies can choose to deal with those who committed crimes against humanity 
with myriad policies. Perpetrators can face implicit or explicit amnesty, trials carried out 
30Antje du Bois-Pedain, “Accountability through Conditional Amnesty: The Case of South Africa”, in 
Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability ed. Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 238. 
31 Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice,” International Security 28 (2003/2004): 43. 
32 Snyder and Vinamuri, “Trials and Errors, “  5. 
33 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.), 11. 
                                                 
 12 
by the international community, trials through domestic courts, or prosecution through 
hybrid tribunals. In Rwanda, trials regarding the 1994 genocide occur through three 
systems: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) set up by the United 
Nations, trials at the national level, and local trials in Gacaca courts which were selected 
by the local population to speed the pace of trying 120,000 suspects.34 In South Africa, 
on the other hand, an amnesty policy was established as part of a bargaining process that 
ended the National Party’s rule and brought the African National Congress to power 
through elections.35 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was established 
immediately after the democratic transition as a public medium to address victims’ needs 
as well as the amnesty issue.36 The TRC was able to grant amnesties, and received 7,000 
applications for amnesty, as well as 20,000 victims’ statements.37 Although the TRC’s 
amnesty committee closed in 2001, only five cases have been prosecuted through South 
African courts.38 In Paraguay, efforts to establish justice after Alfredo Stroessner’s 
dictatorship were mostly non-judicial, and there was no explicit amnesty law. Instead, 
transitional justice measures were generally confined to truth-seeking attempts executed 
by the National Truth Commission.39 However, since no amnesty law ever existed, 
34 Shannon E. Powers, “Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts: Implications for International Criminal Law and 
Transitional Justice,” American Society of International Law 15 (2011), 
http://www.asil.org/insights110623.cfm. 
35 James L. Gibson, “Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation: Judging the Fairness of Amnesty in South Africa”, 
American Journal of Political Science 46 (2002): 541. 
36 Stephanus F. Du Toit, “Tensions between Human Rights and the Politics of Reconciliation: A South 
African Case Study,” in Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies, ed. Joanna Quinn 
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 232. 
37 Gibson, “Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation”, 542. 
38 Hugo van der Merwe, “Prosecutions, Pardons and Amnesty: The Trajectory of Transitional 
Accountability in South Africa,” in Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice, ed. Nicola Palmer, Phil 
Clark, and Danielle Granville (Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012): 447. 
39 MERCOSUR, “Perspectivas comparadas de los procesos de memoria, verdad y justicia en el Cono Sur,” 
(paper presented at the Programa Memoria en Movimiento: Comunicación y Derechos Humanos, Jornada 
para corresponsales extranjeros y periodistas, Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 22, 2011). 
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prosecutions have moved forward recently.40 Countries such as Sierra Leone, Kosovo, 
Timor-Leste and Cambodia have established hybrid tribunals to ensure accountability and 
reconciliation where international and domestic actors work in tandem to uphold national 
law in accordance with international standards.41 In Cambodia, the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were established to prosecute crimes 
committed during the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975-1979.42 Upon the tribunal’s 
inception, doubts arose regarding the capacity of the Cambodian judicial system due to 
insufficient legal qualifications and corruption.43 Possible corruption and political 
interference came to light when the Cambodian government tried to prevent several cases 
from going to trial in 2011.44 
It is evident that measures to establish accountability are increasing. Data 
collected by Kathryn Sikkink provide a snapshot of prosecutions in countries that 
transitioned between 1980 and 2004. Out of 100 such countries, 48 had carried out at 
least one human rights prosecution.45 Sikkink also demonstrates that cumulative 
prosecution years (measuring the frequency and persistence of prosecutions) have 
increased throughout her period of study in Africa and Europe, but Latin America 
undoubtedly leads the trend with just over seven average cumulative prosecution years 
40 Ibid. 
41 Laura Dickinson, “The Promise of Hybrid Courts,” American Journal of International Law, 97 (2003): 
295. 
42 Peter Manning, “Legitimacy, Power and Memory at the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia,” in Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice, ed. Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark, and Danielle 
Granville (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2012): 217. 
43 Jorg Menzel, “Justice Delayed or Too Late for Justice? The Khmer Rouge Tribunal and the Cambodian 
“Genocide” 1975-79,” Journal of Genocide Research, 9 (2007): 220. 
44 “Cambodia: Judges Investigating Khmer Rouge Crimes Should Resign,” Human Rights Watch, October 
3, 2011, accessed February 13, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/03/cambodia-judges-investigating-
khmer-rouge-crimes-should-resign. 
45 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics 
(New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.), 178-179. 
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compared to the global mean of nearly three.46 The trials in the Southern Cone provide a 
longer period of study, however, since the original transitions occurred several decades 
ago. 
In the Southern Cone region and in the American hemisphere more generally, the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights (IACtHR) have taken precedent-setting action to embrace the individual 
accountability model of human rights and have asserted through various cases, first in 
1988 and recently in the Gomes Lund case in Brazil in 2010, that states must prosecute 
and punish individuals who committed crimes denoted in the Inter-American Convention 
on Human Rights.47 
The Southern Cone provides a prime environment to investigate the trend toward 
individual judicial accountability since all five of the nations transitioned from 
authoritarian, military dictatorships to democracies in the last 30 years.48 Even despite the 
trend toward individual accountability, amnesty still persists in some Southern Cone 
countries like Brazil, while neighboring states like Argentina have punished over 400 
perpetrators of human rights violations through domestic courts. The divergence of 
accountability practices used to confront violent and similar pasts suggests that other 
variables played a part in determining whether or not amnesty took hold and persisted 
when military dictatorships ended. Given the varying approaches to impunity and justice, 
this thesis will investigate which factors determine the introduction and persistence of 
amnesty laws, using the Southern Cone experiences to substantiate conclusions, 
46 Ibid. 
47 Mark Freeman and Max Pensky, “The Amnesty Controversy in International Law,” in Amnesty in the 
Age of Human Rights Accountability, ed. Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 58-59. 
48 This includes Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
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especially the transitions of Brazil and Argentina. This study can lend insight to further 
investigation of transitional justice and what makes amnesty likely to prevail. 
Crystallization of such factors that predict judicial accountability are especially 
significant in today’s world, where many countries such as those who were part of the 
Arab Spring, are embarking on their own processes of transitional justice as they undergo 
political transformation. 
Through an in-depth case study of Argentina and Brazil, I will argue that the most 
explanatory factor concerning a state’s decision to introduce and uphold amnesty is the 
judiciary, as it has the influence to reinterpret, overturn, or uphold impunity. The 
executive branch can also greatly impact a state’s accountability measures, although in 
Brazil and Argentina, the president alone cannot determine the legality of amnesty. 
Human rights organizations (HROs) and external actors yield significant influence when 
they are able to persuade more powerful actors like the executive and judiciary to 
establish accountability. Processes of transitional justice are unique, and a specific 
combination of variables may explain a state’s approach to amnesty or accountability.  
 16 
 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 What factors determine the introduction and persistence of amnesty laws when a 
state transitions from conflict or autocracy to democracy? This literature review will 
introduce variables that may have a role in determining whether amnesty will hold or 
prosecutions will move forward. I will begin by addressing which factors drive the nature 
of transition by determining whether the state experiences a ruptured or pacted transition. 
If the transition is pacted, I will discuss the factors that determine whether amnesty is part 
of the agreement and factors that help explain whether (or how long) that amnesty will 
persist. If the state undergoes a ruptured transition, I will also elaborate on the same issue 
areas to better understand the presence and durability of amnesty. I will scan existing 
literature and empirical evidence to address the impacts that can be expected by the 
judiciary, human rights organizations, external actors and public attitudes to play on the 
presence of amnesty laws. Finally, I will examine how the duration of the oppressive 
regime prior to transitional justice and the scale of human rights violations that took place 
under that regime might impact later amnesty. 
 
Nature of Transition 
Which factors drive the nature of transition? Transitions can be pacted, where 
those who held power in the outgoing repressive regime retain that power by establishing 
favorable policies in the new government. In contrast, a ruptured transition characterizes 
 17 
one in which the outgoing regime does not negotiate its exit, making trials more likely.49 
Both Argentina and Bolivia underwent ruptured transitions due to tumultuous domestic 
conditions that allowed for increased calls for accountability. In Bolivia, General García 
Meza’s dictatorship engaged in unprecedented amounts of human rights violations, 
systematic corruption, and economic mismanagement.50 As such, mass public 
mobilization and increasing discontent in the military ranks precipitated a ruptured 
transition wherein the military could not negotiate its withdrawal from power.51 The 
nature of the Bolivian transition permitted García Meza’s opponents to indict him. As 
Bolivian trial scholar Rene Antonio Mayorga argues, “Only with this type of transition, a 
transition through rupture, or total collapse (as occurred in both Argentina and Bolivia), 
has it historically been possible to open the space necessary to bring military dictators to 
justice.”52 With a ruptured transition, the rule of law can be more easily restored, since 
those corrupting it have left power and are now subject to its contents. 
If the transition is pacted, amnesty is negotiated between the outgoing regime and 
the incoming democracy. The likelihood of trials “develop[s] in different ways in direct 
correlation with the paths of transition, particularly in connection with the visions and 
relative power of the different social and institutional factors.”53 When transitions are 
pacted, the outgoing regime tends to try to preserve their influence and prevent their 
prosecution by establishing self-amnesty, and trials are less likely.54 Prior to Chilean 
49 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 33. 
50 Rene Antontio Mayorga, “Bolivia’s Dictatorship on Trial,” in Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in 
New Democracies, edited by A. James McAdams. (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1997), 66. 
51 Ibid., 67. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Luis Roninger and Mario Sznajder, The Legacy of Human-Rights Violations in the Southern Cone (New 
York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1999), 142. 
54 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 32. 
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democracy’s return in 1990, the military ensured that they would retain influence in the 
new government.55 In 1978, a law was passed decreeing amnesty, guaranteeing that “all 
persons who committed…criminal offenses during the period of the state of siege, 
between 11 September 1973 and 10 March 1978”56 would not face prosecution. 
Moreover, President Pinochet lost a plebiscite for reelection in 1988, but before his 
successor took office in 1990, the military negotiated an unsupervised budget and the 
ability to promote officers.57 These legal measures, enshrined in the pacted transition, 
increased the durability of amnesty in Chile. 
 Related to the nature of the transition is the balance of power in the post-conflict 
society. Andreas O’Shea suggests that “the mechanism or approach that [the new 
governments] choose will depend not only on perceptions of what is best for the society, 
but also on the balance of power between the society and its former offenders.”58 
Similarly, Roninger and Sznajder contend that the way in which a society with legacies 
of human rights violations deals with these issues is dependent on the balance of power 
between integral social and political actors, such as NGOs, the government, and the 
military.59 If the balance created by the amnesty law is satisfactory to these actors, 
amnesty is likely to remain unchallenged. If, however, some of these actors believe the 
amnesty law creates an inappropriate balance of power, perhaps granting too much 
influence to the outgoing regime, the amnesty law is likely to be protested, and its 
55 Anthony W. Pereira, Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and 
Argentina (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005), 169. 
56 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005), 70. 
57 Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 169. 
58 Andreas O’Shea, Amnesty for Crime in International Law and Practice (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2002), 70. 
59 Luis Roninger and Mario Sznajder, The Legacy of Human-Rights Violations in the Southern Cone (New 
York: Oxford University Press, Inc.), 161. 
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survival will be endangered. The roles played by these actors will be expanded upon 
later. 
If the transition is ruptured, the outgoing regime might not have the opportunity to 
ensure its self-amnesty prior to their replacement, or its protection might soon be 
removed by a new administration. Since the old regime is often discredited by the same 
rupture that brought about the transition (e.g. an economic downfall or embarrassing 
military defeat in the cases of Bolivia and Argentina respectively), removing amnesty 
laws, or excluding them from the transition process, is less controversial. However, 
Thomas Wright identifies the balance “between justice and prudence” and suggests that if 
trials are likely to jeopardize a civilian government’s success, they are less likely to 
transpire.60 This notion can threaten the persistence of existing amnesty laws, as was the 
case in Argentina. Although attempts by the military to ensure their impunity were 
thwarted soon after the new government took power, amnesty was essentially restored 
due to fear of another military coup and the desire to return to normalcy. President 
Alfonsín passed the Ley de Punto Final (Full Stop Law) and Ley de Obediencia Debida 
(Due Obedience Law) which halted most trials, and his successor, Carlos Menem, 






60 Thomas C. Wright, State Terrorism in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and International Human Rights 
(Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 186. 
61 Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 167 
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Role of the Judiciary 
 Features of the judiciary have been used to help explain the presence or absence 
of amnesty. Judges have the power to affirm, interpret, or annul amnesty.62 Domestic 
courts are also often the forums for efforts toward achieving accountability.63 
Additionally, domestic courts are influential when international attempts at accountability 
are made: domestic courts field extradition requests, and these international attempts may 
initiate an internal review of amnesty.64 
The characteristics of the judiciary are often determined by the scope of reform 
after democratic transition.65 As Abrao and Torelly note in the case of Brazil, “the 
absence of a lustration process in the post-dictatorship judicial branch has allowed for the 
persistence of an elitist and authoritarian mentality.”66 Additionally, judicial reform 
might consist of altering its procedures and architecture to make the courts more 
accountable and independent of the former regime.67 
 In addition, aspects of the court system, such as its reception to outside influence, 
might play a role in its upholding or abrogating amnesty. Francesca Lessa mentions that 
the judiciary in Uruguay was resistant to change and acted with caution. Additionally, the 
judiciary had little training on human rights issues and was initially impervious to 
62 Cath Collins, Post-Transitional Justice: Human Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador, (University Park: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 57. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Francesca Lessa, “Barriers to Justice: The Ley de Caducidad and Impunity in Uruguay,” in Amnesty in 
the Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative and International Perspectives, ed. Francese Lessa 
and Leigh A. Payne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 145. 
66 Paulo Abrão and Marcelo D. Torello, “Resistance to Change: Brazil’s Persistent Amnesty and its 
Alternatives for Truth and Justice,” in Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights Accountability: Comparative 
and International Perspectives, ed. Francese Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 173. 
67 Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 170-171. 
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international influences.68 Reception to international law is particularly important when 
international bodies have condemned a nation’s amnesty laws, since the nation’s court 
must enforce the international decision for it to have any implication on domestic 
practices.69 
 The role of the judiciary is paramount in many cases because a nation’s Supreme 
Court can declare an amnesty law unconstitutional, as has happened in Argentina, 
Uruguay, and a host of other nations. In 2009, in a decision that departed from previous 
Uruguayan Supreme Court positions, the Supreme Court of Justice declared parts of the 
amnesty law unconstitutional, justifying its decision by citing IACHR and UNHRC 
reports on Uruguay, IACtHR demands to end impunity, and the Argentine Supreme 
Court’s momentous decision nullifying their amnesty law in 2005.70 
 
Role of the Executive 
 The judiciary plays a crucial role in the nature and persistence of amnesty, but as 
Cath Collins notes, “judicial branches of government in Latin America have often been 
characterized as essentially dependent on or subservient to executive interests.”71 
Whether this claim is true or not, it is evident that the executive branch can greatly 
influence the trajectory of amnesty after a country transitions, especially when he 
advocates for establishing accountability measures. 
 Consider the role played by President Mujica in Uruguay. When he took office, 
Mujica signed a decree removing obstacles that prevented trials from occurring. He did 
68 Lessa, “Barriers to Justice,” 139. 
69 Abrao and Torelly, “Resistance to Change,” 180. 
70 Lessa, “Barriers to Justice,” 139. 
71 Collins, Post-Transitional Justice, 158. 
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this by signing a decree that would open 80 cases closed by previous presidents, and he 
justified his decision both ethically and as being in compliance with IACtHR’s ruling that 
Uruguay should not allow the amnesty law to thwart efforts toward accountability.72 
Although Mujica was concerned that a complete annulment of the Amnesty Law would 
go against the political will (two referenda showed public support of the amnesty law), he 
himself was a staunch advocate of accountability.73 However, after the Uruguayan 
parliament voted to overturn the Amnesty Law, President Mujica’s signature was needed 
for its abrogation, and he promulgated the Parliament’s decision on October 28, 2011.74 
Although Mujica felt torn on the issue of amnesty initially, his endorsement ultimately 
caused its annulment.  
 
Role of Human Rights Organizations 
Scholars also acknowledge that action on the part of human rights organization 
can help explain differing judicial responses to human rights violations.75 In periods of 
impunity, human rights organizations might use creative strategies to circumvent amnesty 
laws, highlight the lack of accountability, pressure those with the power to make changes, 
and obtain external support to bolster their domestic efforts. Often the actions of human 
rights organizations, although constrained by domestic realities, can revive justice 
72 “Uruguay: President Mujica backs military rule inquiries,” BBC, June 27, 2011, accessed March 27, 
2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-13937023. 
73 “Qué baraja,” Montevideo, May 5, 2011, accessed March 27, 2013, 
http://www.montevideo.com.uy/notnoticias_137933_1.html. 
74 “Derogan en Uruguay la ley de caducidad y ponen fin a la amnistía,” La Nación, October 27, 2011, 
accessed March 27, 2013, http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1418194-uruguay-pone-fin-a-la-ley-de-caducidad. 
75 Strategies of human rights organizations are highlighted by Wright, Engstrom and Pereira, and Sikkink, 
among others. 
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attempts by conjuring memories of the past violence.76 When human rights organizations 
have limited space to protest in the new democracy, it becomes more difficult for them to 
challenge amnesty laws without facing harsh repression. A byproduct of that repression, 
then, is a more durable amnesty.77  
In Paraguay, where the political party of the former dictator Alfredo Stroessner 
remained in power until 2008, human rights organizations were constrained by a lack of 
opportunity for activism and continued repression.78 Similarly, although HRO action in 
Chile was particularly noted for the important work of documenting violence and 
establishing international connections,79 after Pinochet lost the plebiscite, “there 
was…evidence of increasing fragmentation and even contention within the human rights 
community over accountability-related legal and legislative matters,”80 thereby 
weakening HRO attempts to establish accountability. In Uruguay, however, human rights 
organizations capitalized on eroding impunity by presenting cases not covered in the Ley 
de Caducidad (Uruguay’s amnesty law), such as in the realms of illegal appropriation of 




76 Elizabeth Jelin and Susana G. Kaufman, “Layers of memories: twenty years after in Argentina,” in 
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Role of Public Attitudes 
 Some scholars suggest that public opinion can serve as a catalyst to derogating 
amnesty laws and beginning domestic prosecutions.82 Ruti Teitel suggests that “civil 
society plays a large role in keeping this discussion [of transitional justice] alive, in 
pursuing what is necessary, more than just elections, for a transition to be completed.”83 
Public opinion can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Popular demands for justice can 
be manifested by mass protests in opposition of impunity. Public attitudes can sometimes 
overturn amnesty themselves, as was possible in the Uruguayan plebiscites, or they can 
influence the behavior of politicians or the judiciary who have more influence in 
upholding or ending amnesty. 
 In Uruguay, the amnesty law was put to a public referendum twice, in 1989 and 
again in 2009. Victims’ groups waged a campaign to challenge the amnesty law, but in 
1989, 55.95% of voters elected to uphold the Ley de Caducidad.84 Human rights 
organizations also challenged the law before the Supreme Court, but it too upheld the law 
in a 3-2 decision.85 In 2009, the pro-change alliance tried to build upon a growing 
accountability trend, demonstrated by public protests, human rights advances in 
neighboring Argentina, and General Pinochet’s arrest in London.86 Nevertheless, the 
2009 referendum upheld the Ley de Caducidad. Since both votes failed to overturn 
amnesty, powerful political and judicial actors justified their pro-impunity positions as 
upholding the will of the citizens.87 
82 Nina Schneider, “Impunity in post-authoritarian Brazil: The Supreme Court’s Recent Verdict on the 
Amnesty Law,” European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies 90 (2011): 45. 
83 quoted in Abrao and Torelly, “Resistance to Change,” 175. 
84 Lessa, “Barriers to Justice,” 131. 
85 Ibid., 132. 
86 Ibid., 134. 
87 Ibid., 147. 
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Role of External Actors 
The international environment and external forces have also been used to explain 
human rights perpetrators facing trial. The causal chain and individual sources of external 
pressure vary by situation, but might take the form of foreign court rulings, universal 
jurisdiction, statements from international organizations (such as the IACHR in Latin 
America), and policies adopted in neighboring countries.88 According to Naomi Roht-
Arriaza, transnational prosecutions, such as those premised on the universal jurisdiction 
concept, can impel domestic prosecutions through a phenomenon she calls the “Pinochet 
Effect.”89 The Pinochet Effect suggests that prosecutions abroad can catalyze domestic 
prosecutions by demonstrating expanded judicial possibilities and turning the issue of 
judicial accountability into one of national pride, where citizens often prefer that 
perpetrators of human rights abuses be held accountable through their own judicial 
mechanisms.90 In addition, it can mobilize civil society, which may coalesce into a strong 
call for justice.91  
International non-state actors can also play significant roles in a state’s amnesty 
status. As Gary Bass argues, international human rights groups “can provide expertise 
and raise the domestic costs in a liberal country for ignoring foreign atrocities.”92 
Relatedly, “domestic social movements reach out to international allies to gain leverage 
and to bring pressure to bear on their government from the outside” through a 
88 Roninger and Sznajder suggest that “the key political and social actors took into account the parallel 
patterns adopted in the neighboring countries for dealing with the legacy of human-rights violations” on 
page 167. 
89 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction,” The New England Law 
Review 35 (2011), 315. 
90 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, “The Pinochet Precedent,” 315. 
91 Ibid., 316. 
92 Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance, 33. 
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phenomenon Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink term the “boomerang effect”.93 In this 
way, domestic actors can create transnational linkages and allies to help them achieve 
accountability. Cath Collins, however, cautions that “these analyses risk overestimating 
the extent to which transnational cases are brought or driven by home-country activists” 
and that it is necessary to distinguish between transnational cases initiated by domestic 
actors and those initiated by external actors with different goals. 94 
In Chile’s case, despite a 1978 amnesty law, Spanish judge Baltasar Garzón began 
investigating the Pinochet regime’s crimes against Spanish citizens in 1996, applying 
universal jurisdiction. As such, when Pinochet traveled to the UK for medical treatment, 
Garzón ordered his arrest.95 Although he was returned to Chile when the UK government 
deemed him unfit for trial due to health concerns, Naomi Roht-Arriaza contends that, as a 
result of the “Pinochet Effect,” the “the Spanish prosecution gave the human rights 
groups a new visibility as well as an infusion of energy.”96 Pinochet was stripped of his 
senatorial title and attempted prosecutions occurred in Chile.97 Collins contends, 
however, that this was not an example of the “boomerang effect” which would suggest 
that Chilean human rights activists sought Spanish help to initiate prosecutions that were 
impossible domestically. Instead, Collins suggests that domestic human rights activists 
were operating internally at the time due to expanded opportunities nationally.98 
 
 
93 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Justce Cascade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 77. 
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Scale of Human Rights Violations 
 Existing literature suggests that the scale of human rights violations may play a 
role in the persistence of amnesty. In this explanation, for trials to occur, repression must 
be evident on a large scale, but not so intense that possibilities for domestic activism are 
squandered.99  
Aspects of authoritarianism in the Southern Cone were common throughout the 
region. Operating in the Cold War context with the aim of preventing communism’s 
spread, the United States focused attention on thwarting internal subversion in American 
states.100 In order to do so, the U.S. provided training adhering to their national security 
strategy and instructed over 70,000 soldiers from 22 Latin American and Caribbean 
countries, including 11 dictators.101 This training took place in the School of the 
Americas, established in Panama in 1946 and later moved to Georgia. Instruction 
included political training to uproot Marxist insurrection, as well as economic, to end the 
poverty that encouraged guerilla movements.102  
Institutionalized state terror began in this climate and under the auspices of 
protecting national security. Those considered capable of organizing an insurrection were 
“disappeared” throughout the Southern Cone. Forced disappearance refers to “the 
practice of police and military of detaining a person and denying this act when relatives 
of the detainee and human rights organizations inquire about it. It can be assumed 
99 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 81. 
100 Wright, “State Terrorism,” 24. 
101 Ibid. 25., “School of the Americas: US Military Training for Latin American Countries,” Report to the 
Ranking Minority Member, Committee on National Security, House of Representatives, August 1996, 
accessed March 31, 2013, http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96178.pdf. 
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without exception that the person concerned was interrogated, tortured, killed and his 
body destroyed or buried in a place unknown to the family and the public.”103 
Although many of the rationalizations and types of repression were common 
throughout the Southern Cone, the scale of human rights violations differed throughout, 
which some scholars suggests explains variation in the existence of amnesty laws, and 
comparisons are presented below. 104 As shown, the periods of military regimes overlap, 
and despite the fact that each country experienced significant repression, the scales 
varied. Of note, Brazil underwent lower incidences of deaths and disappearances, exiles, 
and perhaps political prisoners than Argentina. Even so, Brazil had a higher level of 
repression than several of the other Southern Cone countries, which have all begun at 
least some prosecutions, suggesting that the scale of human rights violations is likely not 
a key determinant in explaining a democracy’s approach to accountability. 
Category Uruguay Paraguay Brazil Chile Argentina 
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Table 1. Military regimes in the Southern Cone. 
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 When explaining the introduction of amnesty laws in a post-conflict society, the 
nature of transition (pacted versus ruptured) has substantial explanatory power for the 
military’s role in the new society. Pacted transitions permit the outgoing authoritarian 
regime to retain influence in the new democracy and ensure its amnesty, while ruptured 
transitions make negotiations less credible. However, in Southern Cone countries, the 
time that has lapsed since the military regimes fell makes the mode of transition less 
important in explaining the persistence of amnesty laws. Typically, many transitions of 
power have occurred since democracy was reestablished, so any elements of an initial 
pact have been eroded. Therefore, the nature of the transition is important at the outset, 
but becomes less salient as time goes by. 
The roles of the judiciary and the executive branches are of paramount importance 
when determining the persistence of amnesty laws. These bodies have the authority to 
challenge impunity. In some countries, like Uruguay, executives themselves can uphold 
or derogate amnesty laws. In other countries, if the executives do not hold that explicit 
power, they can lobby the Supreme Court and legislature or appoint justices that share 
their view of accountability. The judiciary is typically able to overturn or maintain 
amnesty laws and many instances of ending impunity originated from Supreme Court 
decisions. 
Human rights organizations and external actors can also help explain the 
introduction and persistence of amnesty laws, but only to the extent that they can pressure 
and influence key domestic actors, such as the executive and judiciary. External actors, 
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such as the IACtHR, have no power themselves to maintain or abrogate amnesty laws; 
although they rule on such subjects, their decisions must be implemented by domestic 
actors, and domestic actors are not bound to do so. Empirically, IACtHR rulings have 
been adopted domestically, but decisions or actions externally can also easily be ignored. 
Similarly, human rights organizations often use innovative and creative strategies 
in attempts to weaken amnesty laws. This weakening, however, does not necessarily 
mean amnesty laws will be overturned. Even so, the strength and tactics of human rights 
organizations can be used to find ways to establish accountability even given domestic 
amnesty laws or convince powerful actors to overturn impunity. 
The role of public attitudes and the scale of human rights violations, although they 
may play a marginal role, have empirically had no systematic impact on the introduction 
or persistence of amnesty laws. Countries with high levels of repression, like Guatemala, 
are now beginning domestic prosecutions, while other countries with high repression, like 
South Africa, still maintain amnesty. Conversely, countries with low levels of repression 
have initiated trials, while countries with more intense repression, such as Uruguay, have 
done the same. Similarly, public attitudes rarely have the ability to impact amnesty laws. 
The following case studies of Brazil and Argentina, therefore, will examine the 
impact specifically of recent Supreme Court cases in each country, since I propose that 
the judiciary plays the most critical role in determining amnesty’s status. In Brazil, the 
Supreme Court upheld the amnesty law in 2010. In Argentina, amnesty was declared 
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2005. These decisions have led to the current 
environment, in which Argentina has prosecuted hundreds who committed crimes during 




 Given the literature on the factors that help explain the nature and persistence of 
amnesty, it is possible to make predictions about a state’s accountability practices. 
Without taking specific circumstances into account, if a state has a pacted transition, it is 
more likely to introduce and maintain amnesty. If accountability is established, it is likely 
to take longer to be introduced than in a country that has transitioned through rupture. If 
the transition is ruptured, amnesty is less likely to be guaranteed in the new democracy, 
and if it is, that amnesty is seen as illegitimate and therefore more easily overturned. 
 Suppose a judiciary undergoes institutional reform during the transition and is 
therefore autonomous from the previous military regime. Those changes will make it 
more likely that the Supreme Court will overturn an amnesty law if one is introduced. If, 
however, the judicial system is not reformed after a transition but instead retains many of 
the same justices and policies of the dictatorship, it is more likely to uphold amnesty and 
thwart accountability attempts. 
 If an executive favors abrogating amnesty, it is more likely that accountability 
will be achieved. This could be either through direct action or by lobbying or altering the 
structure of the Supreme Court. If an executive supports amnesty, he or she will likely 
exert less effort in establishing accountability and more in preserving the status quo. 
However, the Supreme Court and legislature can disregard an executive’s preference 
when determining impunity’s persistence. 
 If activity by human rights organizations is innovative and obtains substantial 
visibility among the general public and key decision-makers, it is more likely to impel 
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decision-making bodies, like the Supreme Court or executives who can overturn the 
amnesty law, to represent their preferences and do so. If, however, human rights 
organizations are less active or only able to act in a severely restricted space, they are 
unlikely to have much impact in annulling amnesty. 
 Public attitudes are likely to play a marginal role in most cases. Nonetheless, if 
the public supports amnesty, impunity is more easily justified by decision-making actors 
or by the public themselves through plebiscites. If, however, the public mobilizes against 
amnesty, the result could be similar to activity on behalf of HROs if they are able to 
influence influential bodies. 
 External actors can be largely influential in overturning amnesty if they share 
resources with domestic actors and/or condemn amnesty. If, however, external actors 
remain removed from the accountability efforts, their influence is irrelevant. 
 Finally, the scale of violence may be so extreme that advocating trials is not 
feasible, or violations may be minor so that victims have trouble obtaining enough 
support for accountability. Further, large-scale violence makes the logistics of trials more 
complicated, while a smaller number of trials would be easier to complete. 
 Taken together, the literature predicts that a pacted transition, lack of judicial 
lustration, a complacent executive, restricted human rights and external activity, approval 
by the public, and extremely small or large scale violence make amnesty more persistent. 
In contrast, a ruptured transition, judicial reform, an activist executive, innovative human 
rights activity, external intervention, public demand for accountability, and a moderate 
scale of violence will threaten amnesty and make accountability more likely. 
 33 
 




Brazil and Argentina share a lot: the breathtaking Iguazu falls, a 765-mile border, 
and a history of oppressive dictatorships. In the 1960s, 70s, and 80s, both countries 
experienced military regimes that committed grave human rights violations like many 
Southern Cone countries attempting to eradicate communism. The operation transcended 
borders, sharing resources and information to quell perceived internal subversive threats. 
This said, today, the situation in Argentina is quite unlike that in Brazil, because in 
Argentina, those who took part in systematic human rights violations are being held 
accountable through the domestic judicial system.  
This accountability was manifested on July 5, 2012, when cheers erupted outside 
the courtroom in Retiro, Buenos Aires, Argentina, after a trial begun in February 2011 
finally concluded. The former Argentine dictator, Jorge Rafael Videla was sentenced to 
50 years in prison for baby theft. In addition, Jorge “The Tiger” Acosta received a 30-
year sentence for his role leading the “Escuela de Mecánica de la Armada”, a military 
school that was transformed into a clandestine torture center during the military 
dictatorship. And Antonio Vanek, who led the military regime from 1982-1983, was 
sentenced to 15 years in prison. In total, nine individuals involved in the crimes 
committed during the military dictatorship were convicted and face prison time.105 One 
of the babies stolen from his mother during this period, who has now recovered his 
105 “El ex dictador Videla, condenado a 50 anos de cárcel por el robo de bebes,” Clarin, May 7, 2012, 
http://www.clarin.com/politica/Expectativa-fallo-plan-sistematico-bebes_0_731327044.html, “Argentina’s 
Videla and Bignone guilty of baby theft,” BBC, July 5, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-
america-18731349. 
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identity, said, “This ruling not only repairs the victims, and their families and friends, but 
also the entire society. The sentences today are a collective triumph achieved through the 
sustained pursuit of justice on behalf of human rights organizations, victims, relatives, 
and social and political organizations throughout the whole country.”106 The leader of the 
human rights organization Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo (Grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo), 
who has fought for justice since the military dictatorship, explained, “As a Grandmother 
of Plaza de Mayo, as an Argentine, as Laura’s mom, I felt very good. Finally, I could say 
‘Mission Accomplished.”’107 
The outcome of this Argentine trial, however, poses a stark contrast to the 
situation in Brazil. Argentina has been trying, sentencing, and imprisoning those who 
comprised or assisted the military dictatorship since the Supreme Court ruled the 
previous amnesty laws unconstitutional in 2005. Meanwhile, few associated with the 
oppressive military regime in Brazil have faced trial, and domestic judicial impunity 
persists.  
Although notable human rights advances have been forged since the downfall of 
the military dictatorship that ruled Brazil from 1964-1985, the Amnesty Law remains 
intact and was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in 2010. I will argue that the Brazilian 
Amnesty Law was introduced due to a pacted transition and has persisted because it has 
been supported by the executive and judicial branches, probably in part because of 
continued military influence in civil society. In this way, and due to persistent repression, 
human rights organizations have had difficulty directing actions by the executive and 
106 “El ex dictador Videla, condenado a 50 anos de cárcel por el robo de bebes,” Clarin, May 7, 2012, 
http://www.clarin.com/politica/Expectativa-fallo-plan-sistematico-bebes_0_731327044.html. 
107 Victoria Ginzberg, “Ellos no miran a los ojos,” Pagina 12, July 8, 2012, 
http://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-198205-2012-07-08.html. 
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judiciary, who have greater influence in abrogating the amnesty law. Furthermore, 
external pressure has been largely absent in Brazil until the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR)’s condemnation of Brazil’s Amnesty Law in 2011. The lack 
of external pressure has allowed the domestic executive and judiciary to continue their 
support for impunity without resistance. This said, recent developments, such as the 
IACtHR’s statement and activity on the part of human rights organizations, may threaten 
the existing amnesty law. 
 
Background 
On April 2, 1964 in Brazil, a military junta consisting of General Arthur de Costa 
e Silva, Vice-Admiral Rademaker, and Brigadier Correia de Mello set forth a new 
government and established a national security state, ousting leftist President Joao 
Goulart. On April 15, General Humberto Castello Branco was elected president by the 
electoral college. Educated in the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), these military 
officials were influenced by American fears in the Cold War environment. Because many 
of their instructors were American, they were hyper-aware of the possibility of 
surreptitious takeover by an internal, communist enemy. The military junta abided by the 
Doctrine of National Security contained in the ESG curriculum. As such, they unrolled 
political, economic, psychosocial, and military strategies to quell the subversive threat. 
According to ESG doctrine, the political strategy included “surveillance and control of 
political parties, the legislature, the judiciary, and the executive.”108 Militarily, hierarchy 
was emphasized, and controls were enforced to ensure that the views of those in power 
108 Maria Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985), 38. 
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were predominant.109 The psychosocial strategy consisted of “Operation Clean-up”, 
wherein the military conducted search-and-arrests of particular groups deemed 
suspicious, like students, labor union members, and peasants. These groups were targeted 
because they were considered most likely to organize opposition.110 Further, a second 
group of targets included “concerned institutions which exercised control over the public 
and could help victims of human rights violations, even to the point of opposing the new 
regime.”111 This is why groups such as the Brazilian Bar Association, the Catholic 
Church, and the Brazilian Press Association often became victims of imprisonment 
and/or torture.112 
The powers of the executive were expanded through Institutional Act No. 5 (AI-
5) in 1968, which granted the ability to choose Congress, state, and municipal assemblies, 
allowed the executive to annul mandates issued locally, asserted the right to place 
citizen’s political rights in abeyance for 10 years, maintained the right to remove 
employees in federal, state, or local government, suspended habeas corpus, and included 
various other provisions that were to hold unless the president issued its revocation. By 
1972, guerilla activity was greatly reduced in Brazil due to a confluence of factors 
including torture executed by the state security apparatus. Repression and censorship 
continued, however, and the government faced opposition only from small groups of 
courageous activists.113  
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After the military had restricted political participation, their repression targeted 
not only guerilla groups, but also peaceful groups without clear communist connections, 
such as student associations and labor unions. At the same time, some militant guerilla 
groups emerged with the goal of dismantling the Brazilian military dictatorship. These 
groups drew inspiration from the model of the Cuban communist revolution.114 
Ultimately, however, the more powerful military government, which employed 
systematic torture and infiltration, defeated the guerilla groups.115 This said, some 
guerrilla actors were guilty of violent tactics, such as Carlos Marighella, who suggested 
that “the urban guerrilla is a person who fights the military dictatorship with weapons, 
using unconventional methods. A revolutionary and an ardent patriot, he is a fighter for 
his country's liberation, a friend of the people and of freedom.“116 Marighella helped 
orchestrate the kidnapping of the U.S. ambassador to Brazil as well as other kidnappings 
and robberies before he was killed by the state.117 
By 1974 many of the state’s “explicit mechanisms of legal coercion” had been 
mitigated.118 A policy of decompression was adopted, which maintained the aim of 
earlier periods to combat communist threats, but decompression simultaneously 
attempted to restore democracy. AI-5 was eliminated and executive power was restricted. 
Political opposition to defend human rights and utilize corporate organizations 
strengthened during this period.119 
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The Abertura, or political opening, continued. The elite opposition began 
challenging the repressive state apparatus and the economic model in place. In response, 
the government granted more political space but still constrained certain opposition 
groups, specifically peasants and members of the working-class.120 The military regime, 
however, gained a substantial victory through the Amnesty Law of 1979, still in place 
today, that “eliminated the possibility of criminal indictment of those accused of torture 
and would inhibit investigation into the activities of the repressive apparatus.”121 The law 
was a political trade-off, as the opposition felt they could only create an open regime with 
military cooperation, and amnesty was a way of appeasing the hard-liners.122 In addition, 
the political parties present during the dictatorship were dissolved and the opposition was 
fragmented through the Party Reform Bill of 1979.  
In 1985, the electoral college elected the first civilian president since 1964: 
Tancredo Neves. Neves supported military impunity. He died before taking office, and 
his vice president, José Sarney, took his place. Sarney’s administration instituted 
economic austerity and attempted to restore nascent democratic institutions.123  
In the New Republic, though amnesty was still guaranteed for the perpetrators of 
crimes against humanity, some efforts were made toward accountability. In 1985, a 
covert operation comprised of lawyers, the Archdiocese of Sao Paolo, and two 
professional journalists published the names of victims and torturers in a report from 
Military Justice records called Brasil: Nunca Mais (Brazil: Never Again).124 This report, 
however, was produced independent of state and foreign assistance during the 
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dictatorship and so kept secret until the return of democracy. This autonomous 
production indicates that the state hard no part in admitting or acknowledging guilt on its 
behalf. Instead, the publication was the result of a few courageous activists. Brasil: 
Nunca Mais is a 7,000-page report compiled from secretly photocopied military court 
records. During the dictatorship, some of these reports of torture were smuggled to 
international sources and published in American newspapers. In this way, some of the 
methods of torture were described, such as being hung upside down from a pipe 
(“parrot’s perch”), being tortured by a magneto machine that sent high-voltage shocks 
through a victim’s body, and burning by cigarettes (jokingly referred to as “turning the 
folks into ash trays”).125 The report Brasil: Nunca Mais documented 242 clandestine 
torture centers, 444 individual torturers, and a total of 6,016 torture allegations between 
the years of 1964 and 1977.126 Three hundred and ten methods of torture were identified, 
the most common being electrical shocks (527 cases), beatings (344 cases), torture threats 
(208 cases), the parrot’s perch (189 cases), and death threats (127 cases).127 The 
government prohibited investigation by international organizations and the publication of 
torture reports during the military dictatorship, so these groups were unable to investigate 
and draw attention to the violations taking place.128 This made the Brasil: Nunca Mais 
report more significant in highlighting the repression. 
One hundred thirty-four Brazilians were disappeared, as documented in Brasil: 
Nunca Mais. Most of those disappeared were members of the Brazil Communist Party.129 
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The estimated number of exiles was 10,000 in 1982, and an estimated 10-50,000 arrests 
were made after the military coup in 1964 until democracy was reestablished.130 Unique 
to the Brazilian case, political prisoners were regularly tried before military courts and 
some were acquitted. In the first instance, 3,555 people were acquitted, 984 were 
excluded for a variety of reasons, and 2,828 were convicted.131 Those convicted typically 
faced long-term prison sentences, but many were released prior to the fall of the military 
regime, and all were released by 1985.132  
In 2007, the Special Commission on Political Deaths and Disappearances 
convened by the state published a book titled Right to Memory and Truth. The book 
catalogues 475 cases of violence at the hands of the Brazilian military between 1964 and 
1985.133 However, no official death count has yet been established by any state report. 
For now, Eric Wiebelhaus-Brahm’s scholarly estimate of between 300-500 is widely 
cited as the most accurate number of deaths.134 These figures, however, are all likely to 
be updated when the recently installed National Truth Commission publishes their report 
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Nature of Transition 
 
 Brazil’s 1985 pacted transition was greatly influenced by the military. The armed 
forces oversaw the return to democracy and guided it to ensure their own best outcome. 
As such “the old regime was able to sustain a bureaucratic process of forgiveness in 
which the military would forgive opposition members who had fought against it during 
the dictatorship, trying to turn amnesty into a process of forgetfulness.”135 The 1979 
reciprocal Amnesty Law enshrined this process, in which both opposition and military 
would receive amnesty. This pacted transition was possible because at the time of 
transition, lethal violence had almost ceased. In addition, the regime’s violence was not 
extraordinary in the Brazilian context, which features high crime rates even during 
peacetime.136 Furthermore, unlike neighboring Argentina’s faltering economy, the 
Brazilian economy was relatively healthy, enhancing the military’s credibility for 
providing prosperity.137 The military also employed fear tactics similar to those used 
throughout the years of dictatorship, labeling their opposition as subversive or communist 
in the hopes of discrediting their opponents.138 Since the amnesty law was passed six 
years before the civilian government returned, the military was able to control the 
transition freely. 
 The new democracy lacked institutional reform due to the military’s stronghold. 
The ICTJ defines institutional reform as “the process of reviewing and restructuring state 
institutions so that they respect human rights, preserve the rule of law, and are 
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accountable to their constituents.”139 Institutional reform is necessary to change the 
structures that allowed abuses and ensure that individual perpetrators no longer hold 
influential positions in the new societies. The absence of judicial reform allowed 
Brazilian judges to not only retain lifetime terms, but to prolong the policies of the 
dictatorship. The last Supreme Court judge appointed during the military regime only left 
office in 2003.140 In this sense, restoring the rule of law has proved difficult, due to the 
“legal continuity between authoritarianism and democracy” resulting from the highly 
controlled democratic transition.141 It was not until 1988 that a democratic Constitution 
was adopted,142 and the first president (Henrique Cardoso) who opposed the dictatorship 
was elected in 1995.143 He called for the creation of a Ministry of Defense to bring about 
greater civilian control in areas of national defense policy.144 However, the military 
retained much influence in society and a great desire to maintain impunity, creating a 
formidable environment for human rights protestors who demanded accountability for 
crimes committed during the dictatorship. In 2008, Minister of Justice Tasro Genro 
argued that the Amnesty Law did not cover the crime of torture, and therefore, 
prosecutions against the military regime were legal.145 Active and retired military 
members protested this statement and threatened to reveal crimes committed by Genro 
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and the President at the time, Luiz Inacio da Silva.146 Such a response from the military, 
as well as Genro’s later statement that the armed forces have an “irreproachable 
reputation,”147 suggests that the military still maintains significant leverage over civilian 
power players. Their influence was further evinced in 2009, when Lula attempted to 
create a Truth Commission. He sidelined the project after receiving resignation threats 
from the heads of the three armed forces and his defense minister.148 The military 
influence, fortified by the Amnesty Law and the pacted transition, often constrains the 
efforts for accountability on the part of human rights organizations, the executive, and the 
judiciary, and was initially extremely useful in explaining the introduction and 
persistence of the Amnesty Law. Today, however, since many transfers of power have 
taken place since democracy was restored, the initial nature of transition is less important 
than current actions on the part of the judiciary, human rights organizations, external 
actors, and the executive, although the negotiated power transfer meant that the 
transitional justice process faced initial roadblocks. 
 
Role of the Judiciary 
The judiciary has upheld the 1979 Amnesty Law, most recently in their 2010 
Supreme Court decision. In 2009, the Brazilian Lawyers’ Organization appealed the 
Amnesty Law to the Supreme Court in an effort to make torture punishable.149 They 
argued that the dictatorship committed crimes that constituted torture, which, since the 
amnesty law prohibited punishment only for political crimes, made accountability 
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possible.150 In addition, they argued, the Amnesty Law was anti-democratic and 
contradicted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as Brazil’s 1988 
Constitution.151 Nevertheless, in April 2010, the Supreme Court upheld the law with a 7-
2 vote.152 The judges who voted in favor of upholding the Amnesty Law justified their 
decision on historical grounds, arguing that the establishment of the law was acceptable 
to the military and its opposition and that it had helped create Brazilian democracy.153  
The judges justified their decision by interpreting the Amnesty Law within the 
context it was introduced: as a “bilateral” agreement.154 They agreed that amnesty was 
“broad, general, and unrestricted” and that it benefited anyone who had committed crimes 
during the military regime, whether the military itself or opposition forces.155 Although 
two justices dissented, the rationalization of the remaining seven show the persistence of 
the original amnesty justification even 30 years after its introduction. 
The judicial branch is critical in explaining the persistence of the Amnesty Law, 
since they have the power to declare this law unconstitutional and were given the 
opportunity to do so. Their decision to uphold amnesty suggests that the Supreme Court 
has ignored efforts by external actors and human rights to abrogate amnesty, perhaps due 
to a lack of lustration and an unrelenting conservative mindset. Because the Supreme 
Court has the jurisdiction to rule on the constitutionality of the Amnesty Law, the role of 




152 Abrao and Torelly, “Resistance to Change,” 165. 
153 Schneider, “Impunity,” 49. 
154 “Por 7 a 2, STF rejeita revisar Lei da Anistia para punir torturadores”, Folha da S. Paulo, April 29, 
2010, accessed March 31, 2013, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u728076.shtml. 
155 “OAB diz que STF ‘perdeu o bonde da história,” Folha da S. Paulo, April 29, 2010, accessed March 31, 
2013, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u727968.shtml. 
                                                 
 45 
Role of the Executive 
 
Brazil’s transitional justice process has been largely driven by the executive 
branch. However, no president has outright favored overturning the 1979 Amnesty Law, 
even if other transitional justice mechanisms were implemented. Without challenge from 
the executive branch, the Amnesty Law can more easily be upheld and justified. 
Transitional justice measures were stayed until the presidency of Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso, who took office in 1995. In 1995, President Cardoso, himself exiled 
by the former military regime, passed Act 9140.156 This legislation acknowledged the 
deaths of 136 people disappeared during the dictatorship and permitted their families to 
seek compensation.157 It created a commission that established a framework for 
reparations and acknowledged state roles in the disappearances.158 In 2001, President 
Cardoso sent Congress Law No. 10,559 that compensated two groups of people: those 
who had arbitrarily lost their jobs as a result of the dictatorship or direct victims of 
personal violations.159 The reparation commission addressed the economic nature of 
much of the military’s repression, as well as its tendency to utilize legal and institutional 
mechanisms instead of violence.160 By mid-2010, reparations had been disbursed in 
12,000 such cases.161 
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In 2010, when the Supreme Court upheld the 1979 Amnesty Law, Luiz Inacio 
“Lula” da Silva was president. Lula, as a young man, was employed in a sheet-metal 
plant and was elected president of the San Bernardo do Campo metalworkers’ union in 
1975 during the military dictatorship. His successful organization of strikes catapulted 
him to national fame, but in 1980, in the midst of organizing a large-scale walkout, he 
was arrested. After being convicted of violating the National Security Law, his verdict 
was overturned, and he continued organizing the activities of the Workers Party and ran 
in every election since 1985 as their presidential candidate.162 He was finally elected in 
2002.163 His tradition of sticking up for the repressed, as well as his own victimization 
during the military dictatorship, were a cause for hope from human rights defenders who 
wanted to see perpetrators of human rights abuses held accountable. 
Lula wished to maintain stability and appease the military, as illustrated by his 
response when documents from the military dictatorship resurfaced. Thought to be 
destroyed when the country transitioned to democracy, these documents were actually 
hidden in secret archives outside of the reach of civilians. When discovered, the military 
issued a public statement defending their actions during the authoritarian regime. Lula 
did nothing to counter this statement or punish those who issued it, which so incited his 
minister of defense, José Viegas, that he resigned.164 As José Miguel Vivanco, executive 
director of the Americas program at Human Rights Watch suggested, “Everything 
depends on the political context and political will, and I don’t see the political will in 
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Lula’s administration. Politicians are rational actors. They are willing to challenge the 
status quo only if they have a constituency or some pressure, and I don’t know if that 
constituency exists in Brazil the way it does in Argentina and Chile.”165  
Although the Amnesty Law persisted during Lula’s administration and the 
military retained substantial influence, Lula’s administration began the “Right to Memory 
and Truth” project with an official account of disappearances and deaths. The project 
included “Revealed Memories” which made public archives from the military 
dictatorship and “Amnesty Caravans” with apologies to victims at the locations of prior 
crimes.166 Lula also worked toward establishing a truth commission to chronicle the 
events that took place during the military dictatorship, hoping to bring a sense of justice 
to the victims’ families albeit not institutionalized justice.167 The military felt threatened 
by this measure and top military officials considered resignation. Lula dampened the 
truth commission’s mission by reaffirming the Amnesty Law.168 However, the 
commission did not get off the ground until his successor took control. 
 When the Supreme Court upheld the Amnesty Law, Lula backed the decision. 
Although some in his administration dissented, most agreed that overturning the law 
would jeopardize the nation’s forward progress.169  
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Since the Supreme Court’s decision, President Dilma Rousseff has been elected. 
She was part of a guerilla group during the dictatorship and was captured and tortured in 
1970.170 However, this period is something she rarely references in public and seems to 
play a small role in her decisions regarding justice for perpetrators of human rights 
abuses. Nevertheless, Rousseff has established a 7-member truth commission with a two-
year mandate because “Brazil deserves the truth”.171  They will investigate what occurred 
by interrogating political prisoners and military officials (who are legally obligated to 
cooperate) and utilizing archives. The Commission’s objectives include, “Clarifying the 
facts, circumstances and perpetrators of serious cases of rape, torture, forced 
disappearances and concealment of corpses.”172 Their investigation will conclude in June 
2014. 
 However, Rousseff remains in favor of the Amnesty Law and says that she values 
political agreements that allowed the democratic transition to take place.173 Her decision 
may be influenced by powerful actors in society, such as the military. Nevertheless, the 
presidents of Brazil have not called for the annulment of the Amnesty Law in the way 
that President Kirchner did in Argentina in 2003. In contrast, their explicit support of 
impunity have helped it persist. 
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 Because the executive branch in Brazil has never vocally supported accountability 
measures with legal punishments, presidents have contributed to amnesty’s persistence in 
Brazil. If an executive were to come out against impunity, such as President Kirchner did 
in Argentina in 2003, that president might pressure the Supreme Court or the legislature 
to move toward annulling amnesty. Further, he might appoint justices who would decide 
that amnesty was unconstitutional. As this has not occurred in Brazil, amnesty has gone 
unchallenged through the outlets available to the executive, suggesting that Brazilian 
presidents have not represented the demands of external actors and human rights 
organizations. This said, because the judiciary could establish accountability without the 
approval of the executive, the president plays a less determinate role in abrogating 
amnesty than the Supreme Court. 
 
Role of Human Rights Organizations 
 
The current human rights environment also deserves attention as a possible 
explanation of the Supreme Court’s recent decision to uphold amnesty. Human rights 
organizations’ ability to pressure bodies with the power to overturn amnesty has been 
limited since Brazil’s democratic transition. Human rights defenders have much to fear 
operating in modern-day Brazil. The largely untouched past and controlled transition 
from military dictatorship to democracy means that much of the corruption and 
repression that characterized the period of 1965-1984 is still present today.174 Around 
1,000 civilians each year are killed by the Rio de Janeiro police. The police exert total 
control and are rarely punished for their repressive actions. When Judge Patrícia Acioli 
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sentenced 60 officers who belonged to militia groups and death squads, she was killed, 
perhaps by a senior police officer now in custody. Amnesty International’s Brazil 
director, Atila Roque claims “’It’s not by chance that the police replicate a pattern of 
human-rights violations like that in a military dictatorship’”, insinuating that the 
authoritarian legacy has permitted excessive control by government enforcement that has 
gone unchallenged.175 Although the federal government engages in fewer repressive 
tactics, it is unable to confine repression on a more micro level, and as such, Brazil’s 
human rights scores176 today are worse than during the military regime.177  
Because repression continues on a local level, these decentralized actors have a 
vested interest in maintaining impunity for human rights violations. If accountability 
were established, those responsible for higher repression levels now than during the 
military regime might themselves face punishment and greater scrutiny for their actions. 
As such, the owners of these repressive tactics will likely try to preserve the culture of 
impunity for their own benefit. This will mean more complacency regarding the lack of 
accountability. Additionally, accountability practices often can be spearheaded by local 
authorities who begin a justice trend (particularly local judges, such as in Argentina) and 
pressure federal actors to reinforce their local decisions. If, however, these local actors 
benefit from impunity, this effect is less likely.  
Prior to the Supreme Court case, activities by human rights organizations took 
place in a threatening environment, as illustrated by the immense police corruption and 
activist repression. The tactics Brazilian HROs utilized were dictated and constrained not 
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only by this repression, but also by the military’s persistent influence over state affairs. 
Victims’ relatives groups like Tortura Nunca Mais (Torture Never More) pressured for 
explanations and accountability, but their actions were restricted by the state.178 In this 
environment, HROs assisted the efforts of truth commissions or attempts to achieve 
compensation. They called for public access to documents from the dictatorship period179 
and asked for state recognition of the terror that took place,180 but these actions failed to 
generate the publicity or create the sense of solidarity that could be created through 
actions like the weekly Madres de la Plaza de Mayo marches in Argentina. As Kathryn 
Sikkink explains “Argentine human rights activists were not just passive recipients of this 
justice cascade but instigators of multiple new human rights tactics and transitional 
justice mechanisms”, a statement which did not characterize human rights activities in 
Brazil until perhaps more recently.181 
 Around the time and particularly after the Supreme Court decision in 2010, 
human rights organizations began pursuing more unconventional means and innovative 
tactics to achieve justice. The group Levante Popular da Juventud and Coordination for 
National Memory, Truth, and Justice began coordinating esculachos (meaning “uncover” 
in Portuguese), public gatherings that bring attention to crimes committed and 
unpunished. In April, Levante Popular da Juventud held an esculacho outside the 
Supreme Court and simulated torture scenes evocative of those committed during the 
dictatorship. The protest was meant to impact the federal court, which may soon decide 
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whether the Amnesty Law can be applied to cases of permanent crimes, designated as 
such because the body of the victim has never been found.182 In June, human rights 
organizations along with 1,500 people participated in a different kind of esculacho, one 
similar to the “escraches” held by the HIJOS human rights organization in Argentina. The 
large group marched to the home of Dulene Garcez Aleixo dos Reis, an army captain in 
1970 who tortured victims during that period. These human rights organizations have 
orchestrated similar action for other known torturers, notably the man who tortured 
President Dilma Rousseff: Lopes Lima. The protests typically include singing outside of 
the houses of the former military officials, carrying banners, and writing “AQUI MORA 
UM TORTURADOR” (here lives a torturer).183 According to an organizer of the 
movements, “We actually expose these ‘good old people.’”184 
 Other organizations have also begun innovative strategies to achieve legal 
accountability or impose external pressure for domestic trials. The Center for Justice and 
International Law (CEJIL), aims to strengthen responses to human rights abuses, 
specifically through judicial systems, civil society, or other vital players. Together with 
Tortura Nunca Mais and the Sao Paulo Commission of Family Members of the Persons 
Killed and Disappeared for Political Reasons, CEJIL called for intervention by the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in a prime example of Keck and Sikkink’s 
“Boomerang Effect”. The IACHR found torturers guilty in Brazil and ruled that Brazil 
182 Marco Antonio Martins, “ONG faz protesto contra suposto torturador na zona sul do Rio,” Folha de S. 
Paulo, June 19, 2012, accessed November 3, 2012, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/1106939-ong-faz-
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had to hold torturers accountable through their domestic judicial system.185 However, the 
IACHR “has no means of enforcing its rulings and can only recommend that the state 
investigate and punish human rights violators and compensate the victims.”186 Further 
implications of the case will be discussed later. 
In recent years, human rights organizations have greatly increased their activism 
and efforts to end impunity in Brazil. The ICTJ is still active in Brazil, sharing 
information on truth commissions, and issuing legal advice for establishing judicial 
accountability.187 Victims groups like Torture No More and the Sao Paulo Commission 
of Family Members of the Persons Killed and Disappeared for Political Reasons are still 
active, as are student groups and labor unions, who recognize the victimization that their 
groups faced during the dictatorship. These groups favor visible demonstrations against 
accountability and for re-establishing truth and memory.188 This said, groups like Levante 
Popular da Juventud, the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (Sole Center for the Workers), 
Movimento Nacional Luta Pela Moradia (National Movement of the Struggle for 
Housing), and the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (Order of Attorneys of Brazil), all of 
whom have recently spoken out or protested the Amnesty Law, tackle a wide variety of 
issues, so they do not devote all their time and resources to ending impunity, the way 
HIJOS and Madres de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina did. As such, their calls for justice, 
although increasing, may be less salient than those that led to justice in neighboring 
Argentina. 
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 The increase in human rights activity and amnesty debates could be due to 
external forces, like trials occurring in neighboring Southern Cone countries and pressure 
from international organizations like OAS. However, the work of human rights 
organizations has been targeted by those who oppose their efforts. In July of this year, the 
human rights organization Torture Never Again (Tortura Nunca Mais) was raided and 
documents relating to the military dictatorship that were being used as part of the 
mandate of the National Commission of Truth were stolen.189 This incident suggests that 
the efforts of human rights organizations are still opposed, and many will challenge 
efforts to hold the military responsible for crimes committed during the dictatorship. 
Limited space for human rights activity has made it difficult for HROs to 
influence national accountability practices. If they were operating in a society with less 
repression and fewer dire consequences of calling for justice, it is possible that they 
would be able to better penetrate decision-making bodies, such as the executive and 
judiciary. Since they have not been able to do so, their lack of activity has served to 
fortify amnesty. It is possible to establish justice without human rights activists, but they 
are often critical in constantly reminding society of the past crimes and their perpetrators’ 
impunity, so that executives and courts are almost forced to acknowledge their presence. 
If HROs in Brazil can reach that level of activity, amnesty will be harder to maintain. 
 
Role of Public Attitudes 
 
Initially, public support for the 1979 Amnesty Law was salient, more so than in 
neighboring countries, because it included military concessions. Although it called for 
189 “Apos ameaca, documentos sao furtados de sede do grupo Tortura Nunca Mais,” Jornal do Brasil, July 
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impunity for the crimes committed during the dictatorship, it also excused crimes 
committed by politically persecuted individuals and restored their political rights.190 The 
public not only approved the law but thought it was necessary for restoring democracy. 
The military maintained favor with the general population by perpetuating the discourse 
that the opposition posed threats to society’s wellbeing.191 The public accepted the 
military’s influence and control over the transition and in the new democracy as a way to 
ensure that the military’s promises would bring about a consolidation of democracy and a 
functioning state apparatus.  
In the years since democracy took hold, demand for transitional justice measures 
has been eclipsed by a desire to move forward, with egregious acts becoming part of a 
more distant past with significant amounts of public forgiveness.192 A 2010 poll showed 
that 40% of Brazilians supported establishing accountability while 45% opposed it. 
Similarly, forty-nine percent felt amnesty was valid while 37% supported assuring 
individual criminal responsibility.193 However, recent developments, such as the IACtHR 
decision and the forthcoming truth commission report may bring transitional justice back 
to the fore and generate a collective interest in challenging the persistent amnesty.   
Because the public is divided on the status quo, their influence in preserving 
amnesty is not considerable, especially compared with other factors that hold more 
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Role of External Actors 
 
External actors have recently become more involved in Brazil’s transitional 
justice process and have exerted increased influence on domestic actors, such as the 
judiciary and executive, who have a greater say in the 1979 Amnesty Law’s abrogation. 
Prior to Brazil’s transition, it refused to recognize the oversight of any international 
bodies, limiting the ways in which external actors could influence domestic events.194 In 
early 2008, an Italian judge called for the arrest of 146 South Americans who participated 
in human rights abuses and were suspected in the deaths of 25 Italian citizens. Of those 
accused, 13 were Brazilians. Although the Brazilians were not extradited for trial, the 
incident generated backlash from the military, who claimed a small role in Operation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
Condor, a system of linked Southern Cone countries working together to complete 
prosecutions. However, it also provided an opportune moment for Paulo Vannuchi, 
Brazil’s secretary for human rights to call for the Amnesty Law’s annulment.195 Similarly 
to the Pinochet case, the foreign intervention allowed human rights activists to obtain 
more visibility and support. 
Brazil, as a member of OAS, has ratified its American Convention on Human 
Rights but did not do so until 1992, after it had transitioned to democracy.196 As an OAS 
organ, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) aims to enforce the 
protection of human rights in the American hemisphere.197 The human rights 
194 James Cavallero,”Towards Fair Play: A Decade of Transformation and Resistance in International 
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organizations used this outlet to bring to light Brazil’s persistent Amnesty Law shortly 
after the Supreme Court’s decision. The specific case referred to the disappearances of 70 
people in the Para state who were part of the Araguaia guerilla force between 1972 and 
1975. The present-day government suggested that the Supreme Court ruling from April 
should be respected as “the Brazilian Judiciary is one of the most independent and 
autonomous of the world.”198 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 
contended that: 
 “…all amnesty provisions on prescription and the establishment of 
measures designed to eliminate responsibility are inadmissible, because 
they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those 
responsible for serious human rights violations such as torture, 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions and forced disappearance, 
all prohibited because they violate non-revocable rights recognized by 
international human rights law.”199  
 
According to Votoria Gabrois, a relative of a victim and Vice President of Tortura Nunca 
Mais, “The lack of information over more than 30 years caused the families of the 
Araguaia Guerrilla members anguish, suffering and mistrust towards the Brazilian 
institutions. The [Inter-American] Court´s judgment renews our hope in justice.”200 
Although the decision cannot be enforced by the IACtHR but must be enforced 
domestically, this external intervention may show that criminals can and should be 
punished through courts, expanding the sphere of possibility. Furthermore, the IACtHR 
decision and the Italian arrest warrants may help galvanize the public and encourage 
them to call for their domestic government to take control of these cases as opposed to an 
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external system adjudicating their own crimes. Finally, as was the case in Argentina, the 
IACtHR decision may provide grounds and justification for the Supreme Court to revoke 
the Amnesty Law. 
However, efforts soon after the IACtHR decision to try former military officials 
were thrown out by judges who cited the 1979 Amnesty Law.201 In a potentially ground-
breaking case, in late August 2012, a judge accepted a complaint against two Army 
officials and was able to justify it without jeopardizing the Amnesty Law of 1979. Judge 
Nair Pimenta de Castro of Para decided to accept the case based on the permanency 
argument: that because the bodies of those disappeared were never found, the cases are 
unresolved and do not fall within the time frame covered by the Amnesty Law (1964-
1985). Similarly, in October, Judge Edydio Helio Nogueria de Matos accepted a 
complaint against Colonel Carlos Alberto, citing the IACtHR’s decision and using the 
permanency argument.202 The outcome of this case remains to be seen, but it has the 
potential to set a precedent and facilitate the prosecution of human rights violators on this 
premise. This outcome would be similar to that which occurred in Argentina, where 
human rights organizations determined that the Argentine amnesty law did not cover 
crimes such as kidnapping of minors and changing their identities, and courts were able 
to prosecute some members of the military dictatorship.203 However, even with this 
exception, many who committed human rights crimes are not punishable, because the 
bodies of those killed were found. 
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 The lack of external influence provides a compelling explanation for amnesty’s 
persistence. Soon after the IACtHR condemned the Amnesty Law, it was cited to justify 
accountability measures, suggesting that domestic actors are cognizant of external 
influences and their ability to use those influences domestically. If this decision had come 
sooner, it is likely that it would have been invoked in such a way earlier. Nevertheless, 
external influence alone is not enough to abrogate amnesty; these influences must be 
reinforced by domestic actors. If external pressure is kept up, however, it is likely that 
domestic actors with the power to establish accountability will be forced to respond. 
 
Scale of Human Rights Violations 
Although the Brazilian military regime lasted from 1964-1985, longer than most 
other Southern Cone military dictatorships, the scale of deaths in Brazil was much 
smaller than that in Argentina or other geographically close nations.204 An estimated 300-
500 people were disappeared and executed during that period, compared with thousands 
in Chile and Argentina.205 Brazil also had fewer exiles and a similar number of political 
prisoners as its neighbors. The lower figures could be interpreted in two ways. First, the 
level of repression, which was relatively low, meant that a smaller portion of society was 
affected by the military regime and therefore less likely to mobilize and call for amnesty. 
Alternatively, the low level of repression and smaller number of victims indicates that 
establishing accountability may have required less logistical coordination to carry out 
accountability measures. In Brazil’s case, it seems that since the country experiences a 
204 “Truth Commission Digital Collection,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed November 3, 2012, 
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relatively higher level of repression during peacetime, the human rights violations carried 
out by the military regime were less startling to the public, and amnesty was more easily 
established and protected. When societies with a wide-range of repression maintain 
amnesty, the scale/scope explanation likely does not hold primary influence, but rather 




 Brazil’s negotiated transition in 1985 created a new democracy that served the 
interests of the outgoing military regime. They were guaranteed amnesty and their 
policies were resilient due to a lack of institutional reform. The culture of impunity may 
have also helped create a society with high levels of repression that made human rights 
activism difficult. Their influence is still potent today, and as they remain opposed to 
accountability, measures to challenge impunity must overcome the military’s resistance.  
 Although the scale of violence was smaller than neighboring countries, making 
trials (were they to happen) less of a logistical nightmare, the public remains disinterested 
in establishing accountability, especially as more time lapses since crimes were 
committed. More importantly, the judiciary and executive, those with real influence in 
overturning the Amnesty Law, have thus far voiced their support for upholding it. As 
such, efforts by human rights organizations and external actors, which have been critical 
to establishing trials in Argentina, have not yet been able to successfully penetrate these 
bodies in the quest for accountability. 
 This said, activity by human rights organizations and external actors has been on 
the rise. Human rights organizations have reached out to international bodies for 
assistance, such as the IACHR. They have also begun innovative shaming tactics, like 
 61 
esculachos, that are likely to generate more public attention. Furthermore, external actors 
have become engrossed in Brazil’s impunity. Foreign trials have been initiated and the 
IACtHR has declared amnesty incompatible with international human rights law. 
Whether or not these recent developments have any implications on Brazil’s amnesty has 
yet to be seen. 
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 The Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada (ESMA) was a school for 
military instruction in Buenos Aires prior to the 1976 military coup. After that, ESMA 
functioned as a clandestine torture center that imprisoned around 5,000 people. Although 
it remained in use as a military operating center after democracy returned in 1983, in 
2002, it was declared an Institute of Memory. In 2004, President Nestor Kirchner called 
ESMA a “Space for the Memory, Promotion and Defense of Human Rights.”206 Since 
then, ESMA has evolved into a museum, cultural center, and space for academic 
discourse. 
 Today, those who committed torture at ESMA are facing prosecution through 
domestic, public, and oral trials in Buenos Aires. ESMA now serves as a location where 
these developments can be discussed, celebrated, and critiqued. At a conference held at 
ESMA in Fall 2011, Eduardo Duhalde, Argentina’s late Secretary for Human Rights, 
praised Argentina for holding the military regime accountable through domestic courts, 
rather than an international tribunal, saying that those participating in the trials “are the 
judges of the Constitution, those that are judging the responsibility of crimes against 
humanity and applying the penal code. These are not special dictators. These are oral and 
public trials that allow national control of the process, and at the same time, guarantee the 
same justice in all cases.”207 Undersecretary for Human Rights, Luis Alen had similar 
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views, stating, “The trials that are taking place now are oral and public. We understand 
the necessity of this publicity as part of the process of democratizing and allowing 
reflection so that these terrible experiences never happen again in the future.”208 
 Words like these, as well as symbolic gestures such as converting torture centers 
to human rights memorials, demonstrate Argentina’s approach to transitional justice, one 
which, although delayed and imperfect, is characterized by domestic control of the 
process, pride in its development, and an ongoing quest to return to normalcy. In 
Argentina, executive and judiciary actions have largely determined the introduction and 
persistence of amnesty. However, international actors, notably the IACHR and foreign 
courts, as well as innovative and dedicated human rights organizations have successfully 
influenced the executive and judicial branches, helping to establish individual 




In March of 1976, military officers Rafael Videla, Emilio Eduardo Massera, and 
Orlando Ramon Agosti assumed government control through a coup d’etat. Many 
Argentines supported this transfer of power, due to a debilitating economic crisis, 
increased political radicalization, and a lack of executive leadership. Therefore, when the 
military junta promised to re-establish order, many supported their efforts. As part of this 
transformation, the military government commenced a “Process of National 
Reorganization” with the ultimate objective of eliminating potential societal threats, just 
208 Ibid. 
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as the dictatorship in Brazil and the other Condor Plan parties aimed to do.209 Since the 
military junta adhered to the national security doctrine in a Cold War environment, the 
armed forces believed they should defend the country from both external and internal 
enemies, guerilla groups like the Montoneros and the Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo 
(ERP) became obvious targets.210 Both these guerilla groups emerged around 1970 in the 
shadow of the Cuban Revolution and espousing similar leftist ideologies.211 The 
Montoneros employed violent tactics to achieve their goals which often aligned with Juan 
Perón’s populist ideology, and included creating a revolution by expelling “infiltrators 
and traitors,” a title applied to politicians, labor leaders, and business people.212 The ERP 
consisted of Trotskyite adherents and similarly utilized militant tactics to establish 
proletarian rule.213 But even after these two groups had been effectively decimated, the 
military government also attempted to silence the demands of workers, political 
organizations, the middle class, and students, and to do so, they took absolute control of 
the state.214 Through the state security apparatus, the government intimidated dissidents 
and immobilized civil society. Repression was executed in four distinct categories: 
sequestration, torture, detention, and execution.215 Victims were imprisoned in more than 
340 clandestine torture centers throughout Argentina where they were often executed and 
disappeared, and their bodies were disposed of in the Rio de la Plata.216 From 1976-1983, 
an estimated 30,000 people were disappeared and 500 children born under captivity were 
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appropriated according to human rights organizations, 108 of whom have recovered their 
identities.217 Official reports suggest lower numbers of disappearances: 13,000.218 To 
obtain complete control of the society, the military junta utilized fear to create a society 
lacking means of expression and ways to protest. The press was censored, and political 
and union action was prohibited. During this time, however, human rights organizations 
began to mobilize, especially those whose members were the relatives and friends of 
victims, such as Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, Center for Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS), the Ecumenical Movement for Human Rights, and the Peace and Justice Service 
(SERPAJ).219 These groups faced immense repression and utilized creative tactics to call 
attention to the military regime’s repression, such as reaching out to international 
organizations.220 
Eventually, due to a strengthened opposition movement, internal disagreements 
among the armed forces, and an economy plagued by unsustainable external debt, high 
inflation, and a devalued peso, the dictatorship began to be discredited.221 In an effort to 
thwart what seemed to be inevitable destruction, the dictatorship, led by General 
Leopoldo Galtieri, attempted to take control of the disputed Malvinas Islands to 
demonstrate domestic fortitude.222 However, Great Britain also claimed possession of the 
islands and had occupied them since 1833.223 After Argentina invaded, Great Britain 
drew on support from the European community, the UN Security Council, and the U.S. 
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and easily defeated Argentina, all but forcing Galtieri to resign.224 The dictatorship had 
ruptured, and the military had to redefine its objectives: they intended to negotiate a deal 
with the opposition to ensure their impunity. Before leaving office, they negotiated 
several conditions such as the Ley de Pacificación Nacional (Law of National 
Pacification) that guaranteed themselves amnesty for the crimes committed between 1973 
and 1982. Unlike in Brazil, the self-amnesty law had no element of compromise and was 
established in the final days of military rule. 
Meanwhile, human rights organizations like the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo were 
obtaining greater support. They condemned the military’s actions, highlighting the crimes 
committed during the dictatorship and in doing so, creating a sense of solidarity among 
the Argentine public and a forceful call for justice. In 1983, Raul Alfonsín was 
democratically elected president. He promised that the military officials responsible for 
human rights violations would be held accountable for the crimes they committed during 
the dictatorship.225 Although Alfonsín could not overturn amnesty himself, he urged the 
Supreme Court to do so, and in what became typical throughout Argentina’s transitional 
justice process, the executive and Supreme Court views converged to overturn 
amnesty.226 In the coming years, the Congress and Supreme Court would repeatedly 
determine impunity’s status, and although the Argentine president does not have the 
power to do establish or derogate amnesty by himself or herself, he was often influenced 
by various actors to pressure the judiciary or legislature to overturn or uphold impunity. 
After taking office, Alfonsín established the National Commission on the 
Disappearances of Persons that began investigating the actions of the armed forces during 
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the dictatorship. The Commission published a report called Nunca Mas (Never Again) 
that denounced the crimes against humanity that had occurred between 1976 and 1983. 
Furthermore, Alfonsín established a justice system to hold the military, Montoneros, and 
ERP accountable for any crimes committed.227 
Through civil tribunals, individual members of the armed forces were prosecuted 
and later found guilty.228 The military, predictably, responded negatively to their 
punishment, when over 300 officers were awaiting trial in domestic courts. They staged 
several coup attempts, and although unsuccessful, the threats they carried pressured 
Alfonsín to succumb to military demands to preserve the nascent democracy.229 Alfonsín 
proposed two laws that essentially granted amnesty to those who committed crimes 
during the military dictatorship. In 1985, the Ley de Punto Final (Final Stop Law) 
declared that two months after the laws’ enactment (it was enacted December 24, 1986), 
all punitive actions would stop.230 It was passed by the Argentine congress after support 
from Alfonsín, although its enactment elicited a surge of subpoenas for members of the 
military regime until an executive degree called for prosecutions to cease.231 In addition, 
the Ley de Obediencia Debida (Due Obedience Law) stated that those who were only 
obeying orders from above would not be subject to punishment and was passed by 
Congress in June 1987.232  
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After Alfonsín’s presidency, Carlos Menem was elected president and made 
further retrogressions with regard to transitional justice by pardoning all those who had 
been convicted of crimes in 1990.233 During this period of impunity, however, human 
rights defenders continued fighting for justice, convincing federal courts to begin truth 
trials to obtain more information about the events of the dictatorship after the Supreme 
Court ruled that victims had a ‘”right to truth.” Nevertheless, the information they 
obtained and analyzed resulted in no legal punishments.234 HROs sought ways to 
circumvent impunity and were finally rewarded in 2001, when Federal Judge Gabriel 
Cavallo found that the amnesty laws were “contrary to the fundamental principles of 
international law.”235 Furthermore, in 2003, President Nestor Kircher supported HRO’s 
activity and accountability measures, and used his influence to help abrogate amnesty.236 
Although this decision was not heard by the Supreme Court until 2005, in August of 
2003, the Argentine congress passed a law annulling Ley de Punto Final and Ley de 
Obediencia Debida. Finally, in June 2005, the Supreme Court declared these same laws 
unconstitutional in a 7-1 decision supporting those made in lower courts, reopening the 
trials that had started and ended during Alfonsin’s presidency.237 
Currently, nearly 300 Argentines have faced trial, the vast majority of whom were 
found guilty.238 As the graphs below demonstrate, the numbers of those accused have 
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been rising, as have convictions. Most of those accused are accused of torture, 
deprivation of liberty, or homicide. 
 
Figure 1. Total Number Accused of Crimes Against Humanity, Cumulatively. CELS Informe 2012. 
 
 
Figure 2. Judicial Outcomes. CELS Informe 2012. 
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Figure 3. Type of Crime Accused, CELS Informe 2012. 
 
Although the trials are moving forward in Argentina, HROs, Argentines, and 
International Organizations note their flawed nature. The Center of Legal and Social 
Studies (CELS) mentions, among other obstacles, the difficulties presented by a lack of 
physical space to carry them out. In Buenos Aires, only one courtroom has been set aside 
to adjudicate the hundreds of trials, thereby slowing their pace. As CELS’ annual human 
rights publication states, “Maintaining the present pace, the open cases will take at least 
20 years to finish. That will be an eternity for the victims, the charged, and society 
altogether. It will also pose a risk due to the intrinsic fragility of the process.”239 Human 
rights organizations also lament the trials’ lengthy duration, their lack of media coverage, 
and government corruption.240 In the coming pages, I will analyze the influence of a 
variety of factors in explaining the erratic nature of amnesty in Argentina. I will consider 
the nature of the transition, the role of the judiciary, the role of the executive, the role of 
239 Ibid. 
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human rights organizations, the role of public attitudes, the role of external factors, and 
the scale of human rights violations to parallel the Brazilian case study. Like I concluded 
regarding Brazil’s approach to amnesty, I will argue that the judiciary is the most 
influential factor explaining Argentina’s introduction and abrogation of amnesty, and that 
the executive can also play a substantial role. In contrast to Brazil, however, the role of 
human rights organizations and external actors have yielded significantly greater impacts 
in impunity’s status in Argentina.  
 
Nature of Transition 
 
 Argentina’s 1983 transition to democracy can be classified as ruptured. A variety 
of factors delegitimized the military dictatorship prior to President Alfonsín’s election. In 
1979, the IACHR visited Argentina to report on its human rights situation, at least 
partially due to human rights activists’ requests.241 In Brazil, human rights groups did not 
utilize international regimes as adeptly, likely due to the fact that Brazil had not ratified 
many inter-American or UN treaties and was therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of 
many oversight bodies in the way Argentina was.242 In Argentina, however, the IACHR’s 
1980 report condemned amnesty, recommending that the government instead, “initiate 
the corresponding investigations, to bring to trial and to punish, with the full force of the 
law, those responsible…”243 The IACHR’s recommendation helped bolster and 
substantiate justice efforts on the part of Argentine HROs.244 HROs, which were initially 
241 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 66. 
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hesitant to demand prosecutions, now had legal basis to do so and did not hesitate to 
voice their demands during the transition process. 
The ruinous domestic economy also helped ensure a ruptured transition. In 1982, 
inflation measured 165%, the peso had been significantly devalued, and businesses were 
failing.245 The military dictatorship’s economic mismanagement and allegations of 
corruption created an Argentine society disillusioned and frustrated with junta control. 
The ability of the dictatorship to carry out state terrorism and repress domestic society 
began to erode. 
The military was further undermined by an embarrassing performance in the 
Malvinas/Falklands war in 1982. As noted earlier, in a final effort to regain legitimacy, 
the dictatorship attempted to gain control over the islands, believing that the United 
Kingdom would give in without a fight. Argentina severely underestimated the 
opposition they would face: the UK responded militarily with assistance from NATO 
allies. Furthermore, young Argentine soldiers were inadequately prepared, and the 
military was undermined.246 
Taken together, the IACHR report, the disastrous economic conditions, and most 
importantly, Argentina’s pathetic defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas Island delegitimized 
the military to the extend that their control over the transition was minor at best. 
Nonetheless, before democracy’s return, the military managed to enact a self-amnesty 
law to protect those who committed crimes between 1973 and 1982.247 The law was met 
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with great resistance from human rights advocates. Forty thousand Argentines marched in 
Buenos Aires to protest the law.248 CELS and the Buenos Aires Lawyers’ Association 
initiated efforts to weaken the law in court.249 The new president, Alfonsín, sought to 
annul the self-amnesty law and although he himself did not have the jurisdiction to 
overturn the self-amnesty law, he successfully navigated its abrogation through the 
Argentine Congress in December 1983.250 Although the military felt threatened by this 
action, their severe societal disgrace prevented them from generating considerable 
opposition.251 The ruptured transition resulted in an eroded amnesty and efforts to 
establish accountability. 
The disgraced military’s retreat also meant that the new democratic administration 
could distance itself from the oppressive tactics of the state apparatus. President Alfonsín 
established a truth commission, the National Commission on the Disappeared 
(CONADEP). CONADEP produced a report detailing the crimes during the dictatorship 
called Nunca Más (Never Again) compiled by interviewing victims, family members, and 
military and police forces,252 similar to the strategies now being utilized in Brazil’s Truth 
Commission. The report was a national best-seller and was used in the ongoing military 
trials.253 Alfonsín also embarked on institutional reform, purging the judiciary and 
issuing reparations, a process that did not occur in Brazil.254 Because the military was so 
undermined by the ruptured transition, Alfonsín and human rights advocates were able to 
take advantage of the military’s disgrace to begin efforts toward accountability. Many 
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military officers were initially prosecuted after this transition even though Alfonsín’s Ley 
de Punto Final (Final Stop) and Ley de Obediencia Debida (Due Obedience) and 
President Menem’s pardons to military officers thwarted transitional justice progress. 
These measures will be discussed below. 
Therefore, the ruptured transition poses a stark contrast to the military’s 
negotiated exit from power in Brazil. As such, the military was delegitimized, making 
institutional reform and initial prosecutions were more feasible. 
 
 
Role of the Judiciary 
 The role, position, and influence of the military evolved significantly from the 
initial transition to the present. When Alfonsín took office, he purged the judiciary, 
appointing justices who were considered autonomous, but who supported Alfonsín’s 
accountability efforts.255 He did so by selecting young, inexperienced judges who were 
uninvolved, and thus not disgraced, by the military regime.256 Nevertheless, when 
Alfonsín curtailed prosecutions with his Ley de Obediencia Debida, the Supreme Court 
upheld the law’s legitimacy, exculpating the military officers facing trial and arguing that 
the context within which the law was passed needed to be considered and interpreted as 
an effort to prevent another military coup and consolidate the inchoate democracy.257 
When President Menem became president in 1989, he expanded the Supreme 
Court from five justices to nine, and the court tended to defer to the executive and uphold 
his interests, and at times even displayed “complete subordination” while they expanded 
presidential power, abandoned established procedures, and tended to side with the 
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government.258 Since President Menem was an advocate of impunity as demonstrated by 
his pardoning of convicted military officers, during his presidency, the court largely 
adhered to Menem’s amnesty policy.259  
Eventually, however, the Court began to make modest efforts toward weakening 
the existing blanket amnesty. These advances may have been in part motivated by foreign 
countries like France and Spain invoking universal jurisdiction to try Argentine nationals. 
Perhaps in efforts to evade international pressure, Argentine judges sent ex-President 
General Videla and Admiral Massera back to prison even after Menem had pardoned 
them for the crime of stealing babies.260 Kidnappings of this nature were not covered by 
the Ley de Obediencia Debida, and the Argentine Supreme Court adopted the position 
that such crimes were crimes against humanity, and therefore not covered by the 
Argentine Criminal Code.261 Additionally, through the Lapacó case in 1998, the Supreme 
Court recognized victims’ right to truth and established truth trials, but asserted that 
establishing truth should not be done through criminal trials.262 
In March 2001, a Buenos Aires judge, Gabriel Cavallo directly challenged 
Alfonsín’s Full Stop and Due Obedience Laws, declaring them unconstitutional and 
incompatible with international treaties.263 His ruling was upheld by the Argentine 
Chamber of Appeals which suggested that, “There is no doubt that the Supreme Court is 
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under a special obligation to impose respect for the fundamental human rights, since, 
within its sphere of competence, the Tribunal represents national sovereignty.”264 
When President Kirchner took power in 2003, he implemented significant 
judiciary reform. He encouraged Congress to begin the impeachment process for 
Menem’s appointments who had demonstrated total executive deference, established 
public hearings for future justice nominations, and made Supreme Court action more 
transparent.265 In 2004, the Supreme Court argued against impunity laws in the Arancibia 
Clavel case, claiming that even though Argentina ratified the UN Convention on Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity only 
in 2003, its provisions could be applied to crimes committed prior to ratification because 
the principles established in the treaty were already well-established during the military 
dictatorship.266 Soon after, in June 2005, the Supreme Court declared the Full Stop and 
Due Obedience Laws unconstitutional in a 7-1 vote, reopening cases and the possibility 
of prosecution.267 
In sum, like in Brazil, the Argentine judiciary has been critical in Argentina’s 
approaches to amnesty. Originally, it acted chiefly in line with the executive branches of 
Alfonsín and Menem, largely supporting first accountability and then amnesty. However, 
it began to be pressured and sometimes circumvented by other influential bodies, such as 
foreign courts, international treaties, and HROs, and judges like Judge Gabriel Cavallo 
began to weaken amnesty. Ultimately, it was the Supreme Court in 2005 that allowed 
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prosecutions to restart and continue today. In other words, the judiciary is instrumental in 
the introduction and persistence of amnesty laws. However, the Court is subject to 
influence by a range of other forces, as we shall see below.    
 
Role of the Executive 
 
 The executive branch has played instrumental roles in amnesty’s persistence since 
Argentina’s transition. Initially, President Alfonsín was elected to steer the democratic 
transition, and he immediately began working to distance his administration from the 
repressive tactics of preceding regimes. Not only did he spearhead efforts to abrogate the 
military’s self-amnesty, he also established a truth commission and led a purge of the 
judicial system.268 However, the extent to which the executive influenced amnesty’s 
status was evident when Alfonsín lobbied for the passage of the Ley de Punto Final and 
the Ley de Obediencia Debida, essentially re-establishing amnesty for the former 
dictatorship.269 Although Alfonsín was pressured to weaken individual accountability by 
potent coup attempts, the sheer quantity of officers awaiting prosecution, and his desire to 
move reconciliation efforts forward, his decision to push forward the amnesty laws could 
have been easily overturned by the Supreme Court. Because it instead supported the 
executive’s justification for establishing amnesty, it is possible that the judiciary acted in 
deference to the executive. This decision suggests that Alfonsín’s actions carried 
significant influence even among a body that could easily hamper executive impact 
regarding the persistence of amnesty. Throughout Alfonsín’s administration, the judiciary 
268Pereira, Political (In)Justice, 166. 
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largely followed the executive’s lead, implementing Alfonsin’s preferences in their 
rulings.270 
If Alfonsín eroded accountability, his successor, Carlos Menem eradicated it. He 
was able to ensure amnesty for those who were convicted through the initial trials and he 
helped preserve its continuity by expanding the Supreme Court and appointing justices 
who shared his views.271 In doing so, he was able to influence Supreme Court rulings so 
that they too would preserve amnesty.  
In between Menem and Kirchner, the suffering economy seemed to be the focus 
of domestic politics. None of the interim presidents made efforts to weaken amnesty, and 
some, like President Fernando de la Rúa, banned Argentine citizens’ extradition for 
foreign trials, thereby thwarting international accountability efforts.272    
President Kirchner, however, who came to power after a string of brief presidents 
presiding over a ruined economy, was a staunch human rights activist. Soon after taking 
office, Kirchner annulled de la Rúa’s extradition ban, reopening the possibility of foreign 
trials.273 Kirchner reformed the Supreme Court so that the judicial branch was more 
amenable to annulling amnesty, impeaching six of the nine justices appointed by Menem 
who supported amnesty and lobbying his appointees to overturn the Ley de Obediencia 
Debida and Punto Final.274 He identified all Argentineans as “the sons and daughters of 
the Mothers and Grandmothers of the Plaza de Mayo” before the UN General 
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Assembly.275 Kirchner’s administration ratified the UN Convention on the Non-
Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, 
stating that there were no statutes of limitation for crimes against humanity, and 
requested that Congress uphold it even despite contradictory domestic laws.276 Kirchner 
supported the “Memory, Truth, and Justice” campaign of HROs, a new, three-pronged 
approach to transitional justice evocative of the campaign initiated by Lula in Brazil. 
Kirchner supported this effort by recognizing memorial sites, including a converted 
military school in a powerful gesture of civilian dominance over the military.277 He took 
steps to ensure that his actions would not create the same military backlash Alfonsín 
faced; he purged high-level military officials when he took office and appointed younger 
officers in their place.278  
Kirchner’s actions created a propitious environment for amnesty abrogation. In 
August 2003, Congress annulled the impunity laws.279 The annulment was validated by 
the 2005 Supreme Court decision, a ruling that Kirchner said had “given our country a 
ruling that renews our faith in the system of justice. [The Court has] declared 
unconstitutional [laws] that filled us with shame.”280  
Although Kirchner’s presidency undoubtedly yielded significant human rights 
victories, the context under which he was operating influenced his actions. He took 
power in the midst of persistent leadership failure and economic tumult, and he was able 
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to consolidate legitimacy by appealing to the broad base of accountability supporters.281 
He recognized the efforts of HROs and, by putting his weight behind their efforts, was 
able to achieve significant advances in the areas of amnesty annulment, prosecution 
reopenings, and memory site creation. When Nestor Kirchner’s wife Cristina succeeded 
him, she adopted similar views toward the necessity of establishing accountability and 
has supported hastening the speed of prosecution.282 
Amnesty’s status has largely aligned with executive preferences. When Alfonsín 
supported accountability, prosecutions began, but when he began to fear their 
implications, his Ley de Punto Final and Ley de Obediencia Debida ensured impunity. 
Menem, de la Rúa, and Duhalde all supported and further strengthened amnesty. Nestor 
Kirchner, perhaps in an attempt to consolidate support from the human rights cohort, 
facilitated impunity’s annulment by first weakening it, altering the Supreme Court 
composition, pressuring Congress to declare amnesty unconstitutional, and recognizing 
the requests of HROs. Today, accountability persists, as does its executive support with 
Nestor Kirchner’s wife and successor, Cristina. Therefore, the preferences of the 
executive branch have been a powerful predictor in the strength of amnesty in Argentina, 
especially when the President Kirchner became determined to establish accountability 
and took measures to facilitate that process. Executives have successfully manipulated its 
status either directly, by influencing the Supreme Court, or through a variety of other 
measures meant to thwart or establish prosecutions. Nevertheless, the judicial and 
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legislative branches could have acted against executive preferences and have a more 
conclusive say in amnesty’s status.  
 
Role of Human Rights Organizations 
 
 Human rights organizations, too, have had a tremendous influence on the 
introduction and persistence of amnesty, largely due to their ability to compel decision-
making bodies to represent their interests. They have used courageous and innovative 
strategies to establish and re-establish accountability procedures and continue to do so 
today. 
 Elizabeth Jelín notes the heterogeneity of the human rights movement. She 
divides HROs into those directly affected by the violence and those which were 
unaffected.283 These organizations developed diverse strategies, memberships, and 
objectives. Notably, in 1976, 14 women met outside the president’s house, where the 
president resides, in the Plaza de Mayo. These women demanded disclosure of their 
children’s’ whereabouts, who had been disappeared. In 1977, they became the Madres de 
la Plaza de Mayo, originally attempting to raise consciousness while resisting state 
terrorism’s oppressive policies.284 The Madres came to be easily recognized; the Plaza de 
Mayo became a nucleus for human rights advocacy and their white bonnets, which 
symbolized their disappeared children’s diapers, became a symbol of their movement.  
The Madres were the target of repression; three of them were disappeared and killed.285 
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As a Madre, Carmen Lapacó says, “We were always acting, always thinking of new 
things, always with danger”.286 The Madres participated in early calls for justice while 
other groups felt doing so was too dangerous, as it was essentially advocating punishment 
of those who were still in power.287 They also advocated for external intervention, 
particularly the onsite IACHR visit in 1979.288 The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo called 
for accountability during the democratic transition and continued their fight even after the 
disheartening setback of the impunity laws. 
 In 1986, the Madres split into two groups due to divergent leadership ideas.289 
Nevertheless, they continued their attention-grabbing and innovative mobilization tactics 
throughout the period of impunity. They embarked on innovative legal challenges to the 
amnesty laws. The Abuelas of the Plaza de Mayo, linked to the Madres, argued that 
kidnapping babies and placing them with allies of the military junta fell outside the scope 
of Ley de Punto Final and Ley de Obediencia Debida. They were able to circumvent the 
amnesty laws, initiating some prosecutions despite the persistent impunity in most 
cases.290 Today, they continue to operate and still march every Thursday in the Plaza de 
Mayo in the quest for memory, truth, and justice. 
 HIJOS, also a group directly affected by the military regime’s oppressive tactics, 
has had a profound impact on the erosion of amnesty. At an Argentine university in 1995, 
several students realized they were the sons or daughters of those who were the victims 
of human rights violations during the dictatorship. With the initial intention of getting 
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together to exchange experiences, they called themselves “Hijos por la identidad y la 
Justicia contra el Olvideo y el Silencio” (Sons/Daugthers for the Identity and Justice 
Against Forgetting and Silence).291 Their demand for justice was a prime objective and 
was established explicitly in their title. HIJOS groups formed across Argentina and 
utilized strategies to establish accountability despite the structural constraints imposed by 
the amnesty laws.292 
 HIJOS used creative strategies to ensure that Argentina’s persistent amnesty was 
the subject of public attention. They expanded their efforts to include other Argentines 
dedicated to establishing justice for the military regime, not just those who had parents 
who were disappeared, because “it was understood that we are all children of the same 
history and part of the same state that committed crimes against the whole population.”293 
The objectives of HIJOS were characterized as a fight for identity: the identity of the 
appropriated children, the political identity of the disappeared, and the identity of the 
organizations they belonged to. HIJOS fought constantly for justice and social 
condemnation of those who had committed crimes and were living with the rest of 
society. According to Ana Oberlin, the impunity of the military officials constituted “an 
offense for all the victims but also for all the Argentines who had to share the same 
places and spaces with those who had betrayed all of Argentina.”294 In 1996, HIJOS 
began a new tactic, called escraches, from the Spanish verb escrachar, which means to 
scratch. This activity consisted in convening outside the home of someone who had been 
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involved in the crimes of the dictatorship but was living freely due to the amnesty laws. 
The escraches were festive events, starkly contrasting with the Madres’ somber resistance 
marches. The protestors would mark the houses with red paint to signify the blood of 
those who had died during the military regime. Often, the escraches were accompanied 
by live music and theatrical performances. According to HIJOS, the objective of an 
escrache was to “expose, reveal in public, bring up the face of a person who intends to go 
unnoticed.”295  
 To a certain extent, escraches were a way to achieve some semblance of justice, in 
the form of social condemnation. HIJOS suggested that, “If there is no justice, there is 
‘escrache.’”296 At the same time, however, the escraches served as a tool to ensure that 
the fact that amnesty persisted was at the forefront of public awareness and could not be 
ignored by state institutions that preserved impunity. In this sense, escraches served as a 
means to pressure actors with the power to revoke amnesty, such as the judiciary or the 
executive, to do so. This tactic has also been adopted in Brazil recently. For HIJOS, 
social condemnation did not ensure the justice they desired; instead, “trials are necessary 
because they show, even today, that those who commit crimes won’t remain 
unpunished.”297 As such, their goal as a HRO was always to restart prosecutions. 
 The Center for Legal and Social Studies (CELS), a HRO with unaffected 
membership, also utilized creative strategies to ensure accountability and weaken 
amnesty. After the military declared self-amnesty in 1983, CELS offered to help victims 
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challenge the legality of impunity measures.298 CELS also sought foreign allies, 
challenging amnesty through the IACHR in 1992 and pressuring for foreign trials.299 
Later, in 1995, CELS successfully argued that victims’ relatives had a “right to truth.” 
Through their efforts, truth trials began, which became instrumental in creating a 
framework that more easily permitted criminal trials to proceed years later.300  
 However, CELS most significant contribution, to ensuring an end to impunity 
came when they argued the Símon case in 2001. Julio Símon was charged with the forced 
disappearance and death of two parents, the appropriation of their child, and the changing 
of the child’s identity.301 CELS compellingly argued that, under the amnesty laws, Símon 
could be found guilty and punished for kidnapping the child, but not for disappearing and 
murdering the parents.302 Further, they argued that the Full Stop and Due Obedience 
Laws violated Argentina’s international agreements.303 They bolstered their arguments by 
soliciting amicus briefs from Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the 
International Commission of Jurists in support of accountability.304 In 2001, Judge 
Cavallo found their case convincing, and the argument was ultimately the one heard 
before the Supreme Court in 2005 when it declared amnesty laws unconstitutional.305  
 CELS was instrumental in challenging amnesty from a legal perspective. 
Although as a human rights organization they did not have the power to directly impact 
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the status of impunity, CELS swayed influential bodies which could disassemble 
impunity, notably the judiciary, and was able to ensure accountability in that way. 
 Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, HIJOS, and CELS, though not a complete picture of 
the diverse HROs operating in Argentina during the dictatorship and after, show the 
complex structure, goals, and strategies utilized to combat amnesty. These human rights 
organizations were able to impact decision-making groups like the executive branch, the 
judiciary, and the Congress, and were thereby critical to ensuring accountability and 
commencing domestic prosecutions as a transitional justice measure. These Argentine 
HROs dedicated their total time and energy to establishing accountability, contrasting 
with Brazilian human rights organizations that often tackle a wide range of issues. 
 
Role of Public Attitudes 
 
 Public attitudes were perhaps most influential in establishing accountability in the 
original 1983 democratic transition, but since then, they have had little impact in the 
status of amnesty, just as is the case in Brazil. During the dictatorship, human rights 
organizations battled state-imposed public suppression to highlight human rights 
violations taking place. Although their efforts met with some success, even human rights 
activists were hesitant to call for accountability due to the potentially disastrous 
consequences.306 But due to the ruptured transition, the space to advocate for 
accountability came to exist. After the military established self-amnesty, 40,000 people 
marched in the streets of Buenos Aires demanding justice and shouting “Juicio y Castigo 
a Todos los Culpables” (Trials and Punishment for All the Guilty). Public mobilization 
and support of accountability undoubtedly influenced Alfonsín’s efforts to initiate 
306 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 68. 
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prosecution. Despite a general public that preferred accountability, Alfonsín and his 
successor’s subsequent actions to establish amnesty succeeded. Public opinion data from 
this period is illuminating: through the late 1980s, 70-80% supported military trials. In 
1988, 73% believed that those who violated human rights were responsible regardless of 
rank. Still, the public was divided regarding Alfonsín’s impunity laws; about 40% of 
Argentines both opposed and supported them.307 When President Menem pardoned 
military officials, his approval rating declined significantly.308 
 Throughout the impunity from 1987-2005, however, human rights organizations 
strived to keep the past alive in society by holding public, visible events.309 Kirchner’s 
actions to purge the military and elevate human work upon taking office in 2003 were 
well received by the general public, although a majority felt that human rights trials 
should not occur through foreign courts,310 perhaps as a result of the desire to try 
domestic criminals internally.  
 Although public attitudes played a role in the start of prosecutions, their 
importance was less salient than many factors. The public’s role also became less 
significant as amnesty was reintroduced.  
 
Role of External Actors 
 
 External actors have been critical in explaining the introduction and persistence of 
amnesty and accountability. As detailed in the transition discussion, the IACHR visited 
307 Alison Brysk  The Politics of Human Rights in Argentina: Protest, Change, and Democratization 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 140. 
308 Jelin, “The Politics of Memory”. 
309 Elizabeth Jelin and Susana G. Kaufman, “Layers of Memories: Twenty Years After in Argentina,” in 
The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration, ed. T.G. Ashplant et al, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 
95. 
310 “Apoyo a la política hacia los militares,” La Clarín, July 13, 2003, accessed March 31, 2013, 
http://edant.clarin.com/diario/2003/07/13/p-01102.htm. 
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Argentina during the dictatorship and called for human rights prosecutions, lending 
international pressure on the domestic judiciary to ensure accountability. This external 
influence was important in legitimizing domestic claims for prosecutions during the 1983 
democratic transition. 
 During the amnesty period, domestic HROs’ actions suggest a judicial boomerang 
effect, where groups like CELS sought international assistance to pressure the domestic 
Argentine government to restart trials.311 This effect was evident when CELS challenged 
the amnesty law through the IACHR in 1992, and their conclusion that the amnesty laws 
and Menem’s pardons were incompatible with the American Convention on Human 
Rights.312 In response, Menem instituted reparations, but the IACHR continued 
advocating accountability.313 
In 1994, Argentina’s reformed constitution enshrined its international human 
rights treaties in domestic law, permitting international influences to hold more sway.314 
In 2001, when CELS argued through the Símon case that impunity violated Argentina’s 
commitment to international, regional, and now domestic human rights standards, the 
influence of treaties like the American Convention on Human Rights ultimately eroded 
amnesty’s legitimacy. They further leveraged external pressure through the use of amicus 
briefs written by foreign players. When the Supreme Court made their landmark decision 
in 2005 abrogating the Ley de Punto Final and Ley de Obediencia Debida, they cited the 
1992 IACtHR decision that suggested Argentina’s amnesty laws violated their 
311 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 77. 
312 Ibid. 
313 Engstrom and Pereira, “From Amnesty to Accountability,” 112. 
314 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 79., The 1994 reforms were pushed forward by Presidents Alfonsín and 
Menem and known as the “Pacto de Olivos”, Manuel Eduardo Góngoro Mera, Inter-American Judicial 
Constitutionalism: On the Constitutional Rank of Human Rights Treaties in Latin America through 
National and Inter-American Adjudication, (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, 2011), 71. 
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international commitments.315 In justifying their decision by appealing to the IACtHR 
ruling, external actors’ ability to influence domestic decision-makers was evinced, 
although external power was largely leveraged by domestic HROs through the 
boomerang effect. Nevertheless, it was external acts that eventually justified internal 
decisions to curtail impunity. 
 Foreign court cases helped to pressure the domestic judiciary to hold their own 
trials, through the “Pinochet Effect.” Beginning in the early 1990s and continuing 
throughout the period of impunity, European courts began investigating cases from the 
period of the dictatorship in which the victim was a dual or European citizen.316 After it 
was possible for criminals to be tried through Argentina’s domestic court system, these 
foreign trials ceased. In neighboring Brazil, foreign trials were not used to evade 
domestic impunity in the 1990s; they have only recently emerged, in 2007.317 
Nevertheless, while accountability was stymied in Argentina, European courts claimed 
jurisdiction frequently due to the country’s large immigrant population and European 
policies that allowed immigrants’ children to obtain dual citizenship.318 Arrest warrants 
were issued for Argentines in France, Italy (where trials occurred in absentia), Germany, 
and Spain, but extradition requests were repeatedly denied by Menem, de la Rúa, and 
Duhalde.319 In 1996, applying the concept of universal jurisdiction, Spanish judge 
Baltasar  called for the trial of many military officials who had harmed people with 
Spanish nationality.320 The Spanish court collected evidence from Argentine victims and 
315 Ibid. 
316 Roht –Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect, 122. 
317 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 2007. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Roht-Arriaza The Pinochet Effect, 138. 
320 Richard J. Wilson, “Prosecuting Pinochet: International Crimes in Domestic Law,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 21 (1999), 933. 
                                                 
 90 
human rights organizations.321 An Argentine military worker, Adolfo Scilingo, admitted 
involvement in “death flights”, where victims’ bodies were disposed of in the Rio Plata 
from helicopters, due to feelings of guilt and denials of any wrongdoing by commanding 
military officers.322 He traveled to Spain where Garzón interrogated him, ordered his 
international detention, and called for the arrest of other military officers.323 In 2005, 
Scilingo was convicted through Spanish courts.324 When another Argentine military 
officer, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo was passing through Mexico, Spain had him extradited 
for prosecution, but he was returned to Argentina in 2008 when domestic trials were 
possible.325 
 These cases, although most of them were thwarted by Argentine presidents, 
created a “Pinochet Effect” by making trials an issue of national pride and encouraging 
domestic, rather than foreign, prosecution, mobilizing civil society, and demonstrating 
the feasibility of accountability.326 Undoubtedly, these cases pressured the domestic 
government to begin accountability measures by showing Argentine society that 
accountability was possible.  
 External influences were key in eroding Argentine amnesty. Intervention by the 
IACHR validated efforts by domestic HROs and condemned impunity. These measures 
pressured the domestic government to establish accountability and provided a 
justification for doing so. Universal and foreign trials, although typically not initiated by 
domestic actors, created linkages between HROs and judicial activists abroad who 
321 Sikkink, “From Pariah State,” 20. 
322 Ibid., 22., Leigh Payne, Unsettling Accounts: Neither Truth nor Reconciliation in Confessions of State 
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attempted to circumvent Argentine amnesty laws. These linkages, and the trials 
themselves, highlighted Argentine impunity and pressured the domestic government to 
begin trials of their own. Brazil has recently begun to develop these external linkages due 
to increased opportunities, whereas in Argentina, they have existed since even before the 
transition. 
 
Scale of Human Rights Violations 
 Sikkink suggests that the level of Argentine repression helped make the case 
unique. She suggests that, “the repression was extreme, but not so extreme as to eliminate 
all possibilities for activism. The military regime in Argentina killed more people than 
did the regimes in Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay. Guatemala endured far greater repression 
than Argentina or any other country in the region, and the repression was so severe that it 
eliminated or silenced the human rights movement there.”327 Although this argument is 
certainly plausible in helping to explain varying responses prior to transitions, it does not 
seem to bear much explanatory power for establishing amnesty or accountability after a 
country democratizes. At this point, the scope/scale of human rights violations during the 
dictatorship is less important; what is more important is the human rights situation after 
the transition. This helps explain why human rights organizations were more constricted 
in Brazil, where a more repressive political climate discouraged activism after democracy 
returned, whereas HROs in Argentina had more space to call for justice. The other 
nations Sikkink compares Argentina’s level of repression to almost all have initiated 
domestic prosecutions, with the exception of Brazil, suggesting that this factor is likely 
less important that many of the others discussed to this point.  
327 Sikkinki, The Justice Cascade, 81. 




 Argentina’s ruptured 1983 transition to democracy established a propitious 
environment to promote accountability in which amnesty was declared unconstitutional 
and trials began. However, the Ley de Punto Final and Ley de Obediencia Debida 
curtailed prosecutions, and President Carlos Menem’s pardons ensured impunity for the 
former military regime. Nevertheless, human rights organizations and external actors 
continued advocating for an end to amnesty and establishment of justice. Although their 
demands were not realized for more than 20 years after democracy took root, in 2005, the 
Supreme Court’s 7-1 ruling reopened trials for those who committed crimes during the 
1976-1983 rule of the military junta. 
Initially, trials were largely possible because of the way in which the ruptured 
transition undermined military control. However, amnesty was reintroduced due to a fear 
of military coup and the length of trials. Amnesty was reinforced by subsequent 
executives and court decisions.  
Although many factors worked in tandem to re-establish accountability in 
Argentina, the work of HROs and external actors was instrumental. Finally, however, 
HROs and external actors were able to successfully pressure decision-making bodies, 
specifically the executive branch (Nestor Kirchner) and the Supreme Court. Nestor 
Kirchner became a powerful advocate of HROs and called for an end to amnesty. The 
Supreme Court cited external actors, notably the IACtHR, in their decision to abrogate 
amnesty, demonstrating international influence in domestic annulment. The judiciary and 
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executive play the most important role in overturning amnesty, but pressure from HROs 
and external actors can largely determine how those bodies act. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The cases of Brazil and Argentina illustrate how two countries facing similar 
histories and violent pasts (despite different scopes and scales) can utilize divergent 
mechanisms in their transitional justice processes. Following Brazil’s transition, the 
pacted transfer of power to a civilian government helped ensure the military regime’s 
impunity in the new society. Human rights activists received hostile receptions when 
advocating for justice and had difficulty swaying decision-making bodies and thereby 
having their voices heard in the quest for justice. The continued military influence, as 
well as support from the judiciary and executive branches of the government, helped 
preserve the 1979 Amnesty Law until today, although recent developments, such as the 
creation of a truth commission and visible human rights strategies, may indicate a 
changing environment. 
 In comparison, Argentina’s 1983 democratic transition occurred after the military 
regime had been delegitimized. Their attempts at self-amnesty were quickly overturned 
and trials began with support from the executive branch and human rights organizations. 
When impunity was reintroduced through the Ley de Punto Final and Ley de Obediencia 
Debida and subsequent pardons for those convicted, it was hotly protested by both human 
rights organizations and external bodies like the IACHR and foreign courts. These 
innovative actions, visible to the general public and key decision-makers, permitted 
HROs and international attempts at justice to pressure and influence powerful bodies with 
the ability to abrogate the Amnesty Laws. This happened in 2003, when Congress, 
pressured by the executive, overturned the amnesty laws and in 2005, when the Supreme 
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Court ruled the laws unconstitutional, citing evidence from the IACHR. Their actions 
reopened trials and have resulted in numerous high profile convictions. 
 By comparing these two cases, it is evident that the unique contexts of a post-
conflict society affect the introduction and persistence of amnesty. A pacted transition 
can help aid its introduction, although negotiated exits do not ensure the persistence of 
impunity. To determine what impacts amnesty’s persistence, examination of decision-
making bodies is necessary, such as the executive and judicial branches, which have the 
capability of overturning amnesty and establishing legal accountability. In that 
examination, it is clear that these bodies can be compelled to represent the preferences of 
human rights organizations and external bodies. When this influence is successful, 
decision-making groups will be pressured to overturn amnesty and establish 
accountability, as was the case in Argentina.  In Brazil, however, until a recent IACtHR 
ruling, external influences have been inconspicuous, and human rights groups have faced 
high degrees of oppression. Additionally, the executive and judicial branches may be 
impermeable; they defend the Amnesty Law on the basis of its construction as a 
compromise necessary for re-establishing democracy, and still seem receptive to pressure 
from military groups to maintain the status quo. 
Given the limited scope of two case studies, it is hard to draw evidence to enable 
generalizations and predictions regarding the introduction and persistence of amnesty in 
transitioning societies. Nonetheless, through the cases of Brazil and Argentina as well as 
others in the Southern Cone, it is evident that if the military retains enough influence to 
outweigh those calling for justice, amnesty will be introduced and upheld. In order for 
accountability to be introduced, some groups must pressure decision-making bodies to 
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overturn amnesty, and their pressure must be greater than that of perpetrators of human 
rights violations who are exiting power and obviously prefer amnesty to accountability in 
order to protect themselves. The groups that obtain this leverage can vary; in the case of 
Argentina, it was HROs and external bodies, but it may take the form of public opinion or 
could even be embodied by an activist executive, legislative, or judicial branch that 
strongly believes in the need for justice. 
 In Argentina, these groups took nearly 20 years to reach the critical mass needed 
to influence the behavior of the executive and judicial branches. However, in light of 
recent trends and the growing prevalence of the individual accountability model, it is 
likely that groups calling for justice will mobilize faster and with greater resources, 
legitimacy, and support in contemporary transitions. Domestic human rights 
organizations are likely to call for justice sooner, given the success of tribunals and 
domestic prosecutions, as well as the increase of international organizations and NGOs 
that can bolster their efforts and help pressure domestic governments externally. These 
external influences will bear more heavily on new democracies because of their 
expansion and increased experience in post-conflict scenarios. The public will mobilize 
more easily, seeing the success of human rights trials in other state’s transitional justice 
processes and increased linkages with international activist groups. 
 The cases of Argentina and Brazil highlight the inherent interconnectedness of 
many factors in determining whether a transitional justice process will contain measures 
toward amnesty or justice. In Argentina, it was a combination of factors  (ruptured 
transition, innovative human rights organizations, vocal external actors, and, eventually, a 
willing executive and judiciary) that led to accountability, whereas in Brazil, a variety of 
 97 
forces safeguarded amnesty (pacted transition, continued repression, lack of external 
influences, and an executive and judiciary that favor the status quo). If Brazil had had a 
ruptured transition, would amnesty have been established persisted so long? It is hard to 
tell, given that one isolated force acting toward establishing accountability is unlikely to 
succeed on its own; it needs to be reinforced by other actors also calling for justice. This 
said, even societies that initially transitioned in a controlled way have established 
accountability, suggesting that other forces are preserving amnesty in Brazil, such as the 
lack of external influence, continued repression constraining the actions of human rights 
violations, and a preference for maintaining impunity by key decision-makers like the 
executive and judicial branches. All these factors likely have a larger influence than the 
method of transition. However, isolating their impact on amnesty poses a challenge, since 
they act in parallel. 
In this same way, it is difficult to know what would have happened in Argentina 
had human rights organizations’ calls for prosecution been received by a judiciary that 
had not been purged and an executive who was not trying to gain their support. We can 
imagine transitional justice processes as water filling up an enormous tub. Instead of one 
faucet dispersing water, this tub is filled by numerous faucets, all representing various 
actors that impact the status and pace of transitional justice processes. These actors can 
turn their respective faucets on and off until a successful combination of faucet flows 
overwhelms the rims of the tub. Although theoretically one faucet can fill the tub on its 
own, it takes an immense amount of time to do so; actors need the assistance and 
reinforcement of other, powerful actors to speed the process of overflowing the tub and 
achieve accountability. Similarly, different factors are at play in determining whether 
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amnesty will characterize a post-conflict society’s response to those who committed 
human rights violations. Some are a force for accountability, such as human rights 
organizations and external actors, and in that way, they turn their faucets on. But other 
actors, like the powerful military and a conservative judiciary can reverse progress 
toward accountability. Such was the case of the reinstatement of amnesty in Argentina. 
We can understand actions that ensure amnesty as those that pull out the plug, allowing 
water to pour down the drain rather than overflow the tub. As long as impunity is 
ensured, it is a force against justice, countering efforts by the faucets trying to fill the tub. 
However, pro-impunity actions can be thwarted; when amnesty laws are circumvented, 
foreign trials take place, the judiciary is purged, civilian control of the judiciary is 
strengthened, truth commissions are established, or some development weakens the force 
of those acting to preserve accountability, the plug can be restored, and faucets can once 
again begin filling the tub, albeit at different magnitudes. 
 Once enough faucets are turned on by enough actors simultaneously, the tub can 
fill to capacity and domestic human rights trials begin. The necessity to consolidate 
democracy is also a practical concern when filling the tub and establishing accountability, 
and one that is mentioned often when a country transitions. Alfonsín was influenced by 
fears of another military coup, and therefore lobbied for an end to trials, effectively 
removing the plug from the tub. Brazil’s 1979 Amnesty Law was established with the 
intention of facilitating the return to democracy, envisioning reciprocal amnesty as the 
best way to do so. Given the delicate nature of nascent democracies, a country’s 
transitional justice process should take into account the domestic circumstances and the 
progression toward a consolidated democracy; in other words, the tub needs to be 
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plugged for the water to fill it and make progress toward accountability. Otherwise, 
filling the tub risks being counterproductive and simply wasting a lot of water. The exact 
time it takes to consolidate democracy varies on domestic conditions and thus, an exact 
timeline is not generalizable. Indicators such as civilian control of the military, an 
autonomous judiciary, and an end to repressive tactics may suggest an environment more 
amenable to accountability measures. 
A combination of faucets will be necessary to reach the tub’s overflow point, but 
the exact combination is unforeseeable. The tub can be filled faster if the society 
undergoes a ruptured transition, because the military typically cannot ensure their own 
impunity, and they therefore have less ability to remove the plug. Similarly, if the 
judiciary and other institutions are not reformed after the transition but maintain the 
policies of the dictatorship, the faucet controlled by the judiciary will likely remain off or 
only produce a slow trickle, and therefore, trials will be harder to establish. If reform 
takes place immediately or the society transitions through rupture, the faucet can fill the 
tub at a faster pace and more actors, such as human rights organizations who have greater 
space for protest, will be able to obtain easier access to forcefully turn on their own 
faucets. This said, however, even if the transition is pacted, it is possible for the tub to 
overflow, but the tub will likely take longer to fill and the plug must be in place for 
accountability forces to have noteworthy impact. A pacted transition can be associated 
with a powerful military, lack of institutional reform, and an oppressive human rights 
environment, all circumstances that slow the pace with which faucets can fill the tub.  
The judiciary and executive branches control the most powerful faucets with 
greater strength that can most easily contribute to a water level that overwhelms the tub, 
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and they are therefore crucial to establishing individual accountability measures. The 
president will likely have more sway if he is an accountability advocate; in this scenario, 
he can lobby the legislature and judiciary to overturn amnesty, and can carry out 
measures to make that outcome more likely, such as judicial reform or appointing justices 
whose preferences align with his. If, however, a president opposes accountability, the 
judicial and legislative branches can easily bypass the executive’s preferences and annul 
amnesty on their own accord. As such, the president is able to forcefully increase his 
faucet’s flow, but he may have more trouble ensuring that the tub remains unplugged or 
unplugging it himself, especially if doing so opposes the preferences of the legislature of 
judiciary who have explicit power to determine amnesty’s status.  
 In Argentina, a combination of actors worked together to turn on their faucets 
with enough strength to overwhelm the tubs limit. Creative strategies by HROs such as 
HIJOS and Madres, in tandem with external action like statements and decisions by the 
IACHR and IACtHR, and ultimately, the desire, or at least willingness, of those with the 
power to annul amnesty to do so worked together to overflow the tub. In Brazil, too many 
factors are preventing the tub from filling. The initial pacted transition meant that filling 
the tub was not initially possible. Essentially, the amnesty law ensured that any water 
added would immediately drain. Now, circumstances like the IACtHR’s decision, the 
truth commission, and attempts to circumvent amnesty have plugged the tub, but 
powerful military influences, Supreme Court decisions, and an executive who approves 
of the status quo are thwarting their progress, leaving their faucets in an emphatically off 
position, and ensuring that the tub does not overflow. If the Supreme Court or the 
executive suddenly reversed its position, they would join forces already working to fill 
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the tub, and it is possible that the myriad actors whose interests and preferences converge 
around establishing accountability could do so.  
But should it be a society’s goal to completely fill the tub? Despite trends toward 
individual accountability, it is likely that amnesty will tend to persist in some locations 
worldwide, and that its persistence is not necessarily counterproductive in achieving 
greater respect for human rights and the return of rule of law. If a society is able to return 
to normalcy without trials, and victims have come to terms with their society’s troubled 
past, then it is not necessary for the individual accountability model to be imposed on 
their transitional justice process. Only when it is helpful and necessary should it be 
utilized. South Africa serves as the paragon of a society which has managed a transitional 
justice process, re-establishing the rule of law and respect of citizens’ rights without 
formal prosecutions.328 
 The Arab Spring transitions will provide an interesting lens through which to 
examine these trends. The experiences of Argentina and Brazil could provide insight into 
countries like Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Argentina and Brazil highlight the uniqueness 
of each country’s transitional justice processes and mechanisms. They also emphasize the 
length and evolution that transitional justice processes may undergo. Argentina has gone 
from amnesty to accountability, back to amnesty, and back to accountability in the 30 
years since the dictatorship dissolved. Brazil has maintained amnesty for nearly 30 years 
since Tancredo Neves became the first civilian president in 1985, and calls for 
accountability have only recently strengthened. For trial advocates, their experiences 
portend a long and difficult battle to establishing individual accountability measures. But, 
unlike when Brazil and Argentina initially transitioned, the Arab Spring countries are 
328 Du Bois-Pedain, “Accountability through Conditional Amnesty,” 258. 
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transitioning in the aftermath of global structural changes (the end of the Cold War and 
the third wave of democracy) that have made the individual accountability model more 
prevalent.329 Individual accountability has been enshrined in international agreements, 
advocated by international human rights organizations, and championed by individual 
jurists, lawyers, and activists330. The resulting justice norm has diffused globally, 
indicating that amnesty will be less accepted, on both a national and international level, 
than ever before, with many actors pressuring new democracies to bring their former 
oppressors to justice.331 The environment in which Arab Spring countries are currently 
transitioning is decidedly different from that in which Argentina and Brazil democratized, 
in part due to the efforts sustained by justice advocates in Argentina, Brazil, and the rest 
of the Southern Cone. 
In Brazil and Argentina, different circumstances have permitted different actors to 
yield influence over the transitional justice process. This evolution suggests that even if 
contemporary calls for justice fail, they may be successful in later years. Continued calls 
for Brazilian accountability suggest that not all victims feel the transition from an 
authoritarian to a peaceful society has been effective. This might suggest that tactics 
utilized in Argentina, and some of those in Brazil, could be implemented by other 
countries to help their transition. These measures might include immediate institutional 
reform, truth commissions, and domestic prosecutions. This said, even if some 
Argentines feel satisfied with their transitional justice process, many note its flaws, such 
as its extremely lengthy duration. Argentina is globally unique in its dedication to holding 
military officials accountable through their domestic judicial system, a fact that they are 
329 Sikkink, The Justice Cascade, 23-24. 
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proud of, but that requires an immense amount of resources and time, which might lead 
other states to pursue accountability through international courts. Further, it would be 
superficial to assume that one country’s transitional justice process could be implemented 
successfully in another country. Transitional justice processes ultimately need to address 
victims’ needs and desires, the unique history and culture of that society, and their idea of 
what their post-conflict society will look like. 
  Brazil’s 7-member truth commission, set to deliver a final, detailed report on 
May 16, 2014, represents a significant step in the nation’s transitional justice. Although it 
lacks the ability to hold perpetrators or human rights violations accountable, it is making 
considerable efforts to obtain accurate information about the military dictatorship and 
recover the facts and acknowledge the crimes committed. On Saturday, March 23, the 
National Truth Commission held a public hearing regarding Panair, a Brazilian airline 
that was shut down by the military government in 1965.332 The military’s decision to 
suspend Panair’s operation was motivated by political factors, and all employees were 
dismissed.333 According to Rosa Cardoso, a member of the Truth Commission, “Panair’s 
extinction, dismissal of employees, and the persecution suffered by the company after 
they were prevented from flying not only constitute a serious violation of the business 
owners’ rights, but of all the employees and society itself, who lost the services of an 
exemplary company.”334 Terminated employees, their families, and the former president 
of Panair testified before the Commission and commemorated 18 Panair employees who 
332 “CNV open line of research on companies affected by the dictatorship,” National Truth Commission, 
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were killed by the military regime.335 The public hearing was described as “emotional” 
and those who testified were “anxious.”336 Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, the coordinator of the 
Truth Commission, addressed those present, stating that, “Understanding the relationship 
between business and the military coup is a crucial state of the search for truth.”337 Rosa 
Cardoso stated that the victims of the Panair case already know the truth and have 
suffered from its implications, but the purpose of the Truth Commission is “sharing it 
with Brazilian society.”338 Although the information uncovered by the Truth Commission 
cannot result in punitive measures and will not legally hold anyone accountable for their 
actions, various international human rights organizations have praised the Truth 
Commission’s creation as a step forward. An Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Press Release stated:  
International human rights law has recognized that everyone has a right to 
know the truth. In the case of victims of human rights violations and their 
families, access to the truth about what occurred is a form of reparation. In 
this regard, the establishment of a Truth Commission in Brazil will play an 
essential role in ensuring respect for the right to the truth for victims of 
past human rights violations, as well as for all people and society as a 
whole.339 
Human Rights Watch also wrote President Rousseff a letter supporting her efforts to 
create a truth commission, but stated that: 
 “While truth commissions and other extrajudicial mechanisms can never 
substitute criminal investigations and prosecutions of atrocities, they have 
the potential to be valuable complementary tools for preserving historical 
memory, clarifying events, and attributing political and institutional 
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responsibilities. We hope that Brazil’s truth commission will be followed 
by serious efforts towards full accountability for past atrocities.” 
 
Whether the commission’s efforts are followed by judicial action remains to be seen. 
Although the hose has been turned on by external influences and human rights 
organizations, the executive and judiciary branches are still acting to prevent the pool’s 
overflow, in striking contrast to neighboring Argentina. 
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